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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Statement of Problem 
 
In less than 15 days, 62 people were dead and over 100,000 displaced.1 In May 
2008, violent attacks on foreign nationals started in a Johannesburg township and spread 
across the country.2 South Africans beat, raped, and killed foreign nationals after looting 
their shops and homes.3 The foreign nationals, almost exclusively from other African 
countries, were accused of stealing jobs and economic opportunities, raising crime rates, 
and benefiting from social services.4 For the next year, temporary camps continued to 
shelter hundreds of foreign nationals afraid to re-enter South African society.5  
In the first 23 years after apartheid, attacks by South Africans against foreign 
nationals – which we can term xenophobic - resulted in the death of 200 people.6 The 
media has largely portrayed the violence as a result of discontent in the social sector and 
citizen-driven reactions to economic hardship. The xenophobia, or perhaps more aptly 
called Afrophobia for its concentration on foreign Africans, seems to be anchored in the 
disillusionment of democratic South Africa. When apartheid ended in the 1990s, many 
South Africans believed the new government would usher in a comprehensive social and 
                                                 
1 Jean Pierre Misago, Tamlyn Monson, Tara Polzer, and Loren Landau, May 2008 Violence Against 
Foreign Nationals in South Africa (Forced Migration and Food Programmes & CoRMSA, 2010), 46; See 
also South African Human Rights Commission, Report on the SAHRC Investigation into Issues of Rule of 
Law, Justice and Impunity Arising out of the 2008 Public Violence against Non-Nationals. (Johannesburg: 
South African Human Rights Commission, 2010), 21.  
2 Misago, Monson, Polzer, and Landau, May 2008 Violence, 46. 
3 Misago, Monson, Polzer, and Landau, May 2008 Violence, 52. 
4 Misago, Monson, Polzer, and Landau, May 2008 Violence, 54-55. 
5 Yazeed Kamaldien and Nivashni Nair, “Cape Town Wants to Evict Refugees,” The Times, May 11, 2009, 
web.archive.org/web/20090514060028/http://www.thetimes.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=996699. 
6 Charles Kumolu, “S/Africa Xenophobic attacks: 200 foreigners killed, maimed since 1994 – 
Investigation,” Vanguard, February 26, 2017, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/safrica-xenophobic-
attacks-200-foreigners-killed-maimed-since-1994-investigation/. 
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economic shift. A little more than 20 years later, however, apartheid’s economic legacy is 
still obvious to the families living in townships,7 student unable to pay school fees,8 and 
the majority of South Africans, who live in poverty.9 
At a workshop on the rights of refugees and asylum seekers I attended in 2016, a 
woman left the conference in tears, too upset to continue. She said her uncle, exiled 
during the struggle against apartheid, was mistreated in the African countries that 
sheltered him.10 She did not believe that refugees should have the same protections as 
citizens under the Constitution after the way her uncle had been treated.11 While many 
sources document the preferential treatment South Africans received while exiled,12 the 
discrepancy does not matter. To this woman, that day, her truth was that her family 
fought against apartheid. Her family had lost their home and country, and been mistreated 
in another. Now although apartheid has ended, her family still lived in a township and 
citizens are still fighting over the same few resources. Before she left, she said the 
Constitution had been drafted when everyone was “crazy about liberation,” but now 
needs to be revised to prioritize protecting citizens.13   
                                                 
7 Oliver Wainwright, “Apartheid ended 20 years ago, so why is Cape Town still 'a paradise for the few'?,” 
The Guardian, April 30, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/apr/30/cape-town-apartheid-
ended-still-paradise-few-south-africa. 
8 Sophia Hyatt, “South Africa’s housing crisis: A remnant of apartheid,” Al Jazeera, October 11, 2016, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/09/south-africa-housing-crisis-remnant-apartheid-
160929094237631.html. 
9 “Poverty on the Rise in South Africa,” Statistics South Africa, last modified August 22, 2017, 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10334. 
10 This information was obtained from a participant during the Dullah Omar Institute’s Civic Education 
Training Workshop on Refugees and Human Rights in South Africa, July 14, 2016, in Cape Town, South 
Africa. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See generally Lewis Nkosi, Home and Exile, London, England: Longmans, 1965. 
13 This information was obtained from a participant during the Dullah Omar Institute’s Civic Education 
Training Workshop on Refugees and Human Rights in South Africa, July 14, 2016, in Cape Town, South 
Africa. 
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 The narrative that Afrophobia in South Africa is solely a product from public 
opinion and reactions from citizens ignores the influence of political institutions within 
South Africa. Government institutions have a responsibility to uphold human rights and 
provide leadership for its citizenry. One such institution is the Department of Home 
Affairs (DHA). The DHA is the government department responsible for two main state 
functions: 1) managing and verifying the “identity and status” of South African citizens 
and foreign nationals while in South Africa, and 2) managing the immigration and 
asylum systems.14 In 2016, the DHA proposed a new amendment to the Refugees Act and 
a new policy paper that positions refugees as national security risks and includes 
language that severely limits refugees’ rights to freedom of movement, work, and study. 
Furthermore, the DHA’s procedural steps to implement these policies have avoided 
prescribed public engagement, and perhaps violated administrative as well as 
constitutional law in executive overreach. These proposals, however, are complicated by 
obligations under domestic constitutional and international laws. This study examines 
how the DHA’s asylum policies, laws, and implementation of those policies speak to 
South Africa’s commitment (both legally and socially) to protecting human rights.  
Since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s, politically and economically 
stable South Africa has become a haven for sub-Saharan African refugees seeking 
protection from political persecution and war. The asylum process, overseen by the DHA, 
is complicated by limited access to refugee reception offices (which provide 
documentation and necessary services), an estimated backlog of 260,000 individuals in 
                                                 
14 “About Us,” Department of Home Affairs, last revised 2018, http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/2. 
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appeals,15 and an average processing time of five to ten years before final refugee status 
is granted or denied. Therefore, the complexity and vulnerability of hundreds of 
thousands of asylum seekers’ daily lives for almost a decade are dependent upon the 
DHA policies. 
Under apartheid (1948-1991), South Africa subscribed to an exclusionary 
approach to immigration. The apartheid government generally practiced isolationism and 
closed its borders to most immigrants.16 When immigrants were accepted, Africans were 
discriminated against the most, and were sometimes only permitted to enter the country 
on temporary mining contracts, but were ineligible for permanent resident status.17 This 
practice created a separate immigration process for nonwhites (who were barred from 
naturalized citizenship), which continued after apartheid into the 1990s.18 
After the transition to democracy, South Africa’s immigration policies largely did 
not change. The first post-apartheid immigration legislation, the Aliens Control Act of 
1991, carried the moniker “apartheid’s final act” until repealed and replaced by the 
Immigration Act over a decade later.19 The Aliens Control Act continued apartheid’s 
practice of authorizing police officers to question and detain anyone who did not seem to 
belong, and placed the burden on the individual to prove otherwise. While the Act has 
been repealed, the continuation of apartheid immigration policies for over a decade after 
                                                 
15 Minister of Home Affairs, “Question NW267 to the Minister of Home Affairs,” Questions and Replies, 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group, last modified March 2017, https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/4690/. 
16 Jonathan Crush and David A. McDonald, "Introduction to Special Issue: Evaluating South African 
Immigration Policy after Apartheid," Africa Today 48, no. 3 (2001), 2, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187430. 
17 Crush and McDonald, “Introduction to Special Issue,” 2-3. 
18 Crush and McDonald, “Introduction to Special Issue,” 3.; Department of Home Affairs. Green Paper on 
the International Migration for South Africa, June 2016, 
https://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/40088_gon738.pdf. 
19 Crush and McDonald, “Introduction to Special Issue,” 1. 
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the democratic transition speaks to the institutional memory of apartheid priorities. Seven 
years later, South Africa enacted the Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998, which has been 
sparingly amended until recently.  
The new policy papers and amendment (recently adopted by Parliament in 
November 2017) seek a risk-based approach to the asylum process and includes 
xenophobic language that conflates asylum seekers and foreign nationals with criminal 
activity. A risk-based approach determines the security risk a refugee poses to the South 
African public. One of the DHA’s proposed solutions to reducing risk is the creation of 
Processing Centres at ports of entry, where high-risk refugees must stay throughout their 
application process (low-risk refugees would be “released” to organizations or family 
members).20 These centers, however, would likely violate international law by penalizing 
refugees for crossing international borders without documentation.21 
Furthermore, the procedural steps the DHA has taken to implement policies is at 
best misleading for stakeholders and perhaps violates accepted practices for stakeholder 
inclusion and public engagement. For example, in 2012 the DHA held a meeting with 
stakeholders to discuss the closure of the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office, where 
refugees must apply or renew their application for refugee status.22 During this meeting, 
the DHA denied a shift in policy to close reception offices and relocate them to the 
northern provinces. However, less than a month later, DHA announced a shift in policy to 
                                                 
20 Department of Home Affairs, Green Paper on the International Migration for South Africa, 65-66. 
21 Legal Resources Centre, and Lawyers for Human Rights, “Joint Submission by the Legal Resources 
Centre and Lawyers for Human Rights to the Department of Home Affairs in Respect of Green Paper on 
International Migration in South Africa” (Legal Resources Centre & Lawyers for Human Rights, 2016), 61, 
http://lrc.org.za/art_external/pdf/2016_09_30_Submission_Green%20Paper_International_Migration_comp
ressed.pdf. 
22 Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town and Others 2013 (6) SA 134 
(SCA). 
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permanently close the Cape Town office and relocate it to the northern province without 
notice to stakeholders. 
 
Context of Study 
 
This study is a significant addition to the current body of research surrounding 
immigration and asylum issues in South Africa. The xenophobic attacks in 2008, 2015, 
and 2017, as well as negative public perception of foreign nationals (especially African 
asylum seekers), were extensively researched after each incident by scholars, civil 
society, and state institutions such as the South African Human Rights Commission. 
Additionally, the few legislative and policy changes have been studied as well. However, 
scholarship lacks an in depth legal analysis of the DHA’s recent policies, legislation, and 
administrative decisions, and their impact on South Africa’s commitment to human 
rights.  
 Globally, South Africa’s approach to immigration, specifically refugees, impacts 
the international response to asylum seekers. South Africa’s progressive constitution 
provides protection for foreign nationals that far exceeds protections offered in many 
other countries and international law. South Africa’s approach to refugees and 
enforcement (or lack thereof) of these protections may create precedent for other 
countries facing a refugee crisis to subvert obligations to international agreements and 
engage in immigration policies lacking critical evaluation of institutional biases.  
 South Africa is not a superpower, nor is it a particularly influential state in global 
politics, albeit it is the regional superpower of sub-Saharan Africa. The EU does not, and 
likely will not, revert its closed border policy towards asylum seekers because South 
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Africa’s constitution offers rights to foreign nationals. If anything, South Africa is 
following the EU’s precedent in managing the influx of asylum seekers by adopting 
policies of exclusion. The importance of South Africa’s asylum policies lies in its own 
commitment to human rights. If the “Rainbow Nation” cannot temper the xenophobic 
tone within its own institutions, then the value of incorporating human rights into 
domestic law will dissipate. 
 
Methodology 
 
 This study bases its analysis of the DHA’s policies from government texts such as 
court cases, immigration and refugee laws, policy proposals, parliamentary debates, 
official publications, civil society’s submissions to government policies and reports, 
speeches, articles, and newspapers. The information gathered for this study include public 
records shared with me in my capacity as a student working for a civil society 
organization in Cape Town, and my own observations from court and parliarmentary 
proceedings and working with asylum seekers navigating the asylum process. 
This study is limited to laws, policies, and administrative decisions by the DHA 
from the transition to democracy in the early 1990s to present day. While some 
international law will be discussed in the study, it is limited to treaties and conventions 
ratified by and thus binding South Africa. In the context of a post-colonial state, the 
DHA’s policies and decisions should only be measured against the state’s self-
determined obligations. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
SOCIAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Increased global migration has furthered “people’s preoccupation with 
belonging.”23 The politics of who “belongs” in a country can be complex and influenced 
by the creation of an identity, pressures of scarce resources, and the role of the state. 
South Africa’s politics of belonging and context of the refugee and asylum sphere 
provide a better understanding of DHA’s role in the asylum process. 
 
 
The Politics of Belonging: A Framework 
 
The politics of belonging, defined by John Crowley as “the dirty work of 
boundary maintenance,”24 was further defined by Yuval-Davis as the boundaries “that 
separate the world population into ‘us’ and ‘them’.”25 How the world separates, though, 
is multifaceted and fluid.  
Yuval-Davis simplified belonging by cataloguing three levels: 
The first level concerns social locations; the second relates to an 
individual’s identifications and emotional attachments to various 
collectivities and groupings; the third relates to ethical and political value 
systems with which people judge their own and others’ belonging/s. These 
different levels are interrelated, but cannot be reduced to each other, as so 
many political projects of belonging tend to assume.26 
 
Social locations denote membership to a gender, ethnicity, socio-economic class, age-
group, or profession, to name a few.27 Social locations may or may not be fluid, and so 
                                                 
23 Peter Geschiere, The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 17. 
24 Nira Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," Patterns of Prejudice 40, no. 3 (2006): 
204, doi: 10.1080/00313220600769331. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," 199. 
27 Ibid. 
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Yuval-Davis emphasizes the need for an intersectional approach to social locations.28 
Identity is defined as “stories that people tell about themselves and each other” and are 
reinforced by comparisons between groups.29 These stories can be about the individual or 
the group, but they often reflect an interplay between the individual and the importance 
of group membership.30 Importantly, Yuval-Davis links the identity with emotion:  
Constructions of belonging, however, cannot and should not be seen as 
merely cognitive stories. They reflect emotional investments and desire for 
attachments: ‘Individuals and groups are caught within wanting to belong, 
wanting to become, a process that is fueled by yearning rather than 
positing of identity as a stable state.’ Elspeth Probyn, as well as Anne-
Marie Fortier, construct identity as transition, always producing itself 
through the combined processes of being and becoming, belonging and 
longing to belong. This duality is often reflected in narratives of identity.31 
(Internal citations omitted.) 
 
Ethical and political values, the third and final level, speak to how the first two levels are 
“valued and judged.”32 Yuval-Davis argues that this level influences beliefs on where 
identity boundaries are drawn, and how inclusive or exclusive the boundaries should be.33 
In this way, belonging becomes the politics of belonging.34 
The “us” and “them” categories are divided by both identity and citizenship.35 
Identity, as stated above, is generally defined as stories about individuals, and are 
reinforced by comparisons between groups.36 Yuval-Davis contextualizes citizenship as 
                                                 
28 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," 199-200. 
29 Nira Yuval-Davis, Kalpana Kannabirān, and Ulrike Vieten. The Situated Politics of Belonging (London; 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2006), 2. ProQuest Ebook Central.; See also Laurent Licata, Margarita 
Sanchez-Mazas, and Eva G.T. Green, "Xenophobia: Social Psychological Aspects," in Handbook of 
Identity Theory and Research, ed. S.J. Schwartz et al., 895-916 (New York: Springer, 2015), doi: 
10.1007/978-1-4419-7988-9_38. 
30 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," 202. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," 203. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Yuval-Davis, "Belonging and the Politics of Belonging," 203-204. 
35 Yuval-Davis, Kannabirān, and Ulrike, The Situated Politics of Belonging, 1. 
36 Yuval-Davis, Kannabirān, and Ulrike, The Situated Politics of Belonging, 2; See generally Licata, 
Sanchez-Mazas, and Green, “Xenophobia.”  
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“full membership” within a society, including all rights and responsibilities as a 
participant.37 Consequently, politics of belonging creates divisions between the included 
and the excluded. Determining citizenship and who has the right to belong is especially 
important when resources are scarce. While citizenship offers the opportunity of, and 
access to, resources without guarantee of receipt, those designated as strangers are 
precluded from competing for resources at all.38 
 
Role of the Postcolonial State in the Politics of Belonging 
 
 Sara Dorman argues that governments influence belonging by shaping “identity 
discourses.”39 In postcolonial Africa specifically, political contests are founded on the 
politics of identity instead of political ideology.40 This reinforces the perceptions of “us” 
and “them”.41 Dorman reasons that:  
Post-independence governments have been faced with the challenge of 
cementing a national identity within a state container that both divides 
communities and encloses multiple ethnic groups. This embodies itself in 
the identification of strangers, usually outside the state borders, through 
political agitations against foreigners, whose negativity is contrasted to a 
positive self-image.42 
 
Part of the challenge for post-colonial states, particularly those with a settler colonial 
history, is that not only must the state contend with a racialized political and identity 
                                                 
37 Yuval-Davis, Kannabirān, and Ulrike, The Situated Politics of Belonging, 2. 
38 Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn, Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, Citizenship and Conflict. 
(New York: Zed Books, 2013), 9. 
39 Sara Dorman, “Citizenship in Africa: the politics of belonging,” in Routledge Handbook of Global 
Citizenship Studies, ed. Engin Isin, and Peters Nyers, 161-171 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 161. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Sara Dorman, Daniel P. Hammett and Paul Nugent, Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and 
Citizenship in Africa, (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 10. 
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history, but it must also incorporate “previously privileged minority racial groups” in 
citizenship and the nation’s identity.43  
For new democracies with strong leaders, states were able to “seize control and 
‘stabilize’ the relationship between states and citizens,” which was an imperative for 
creating a single identity comprising multiple ethnic groups.44 In fact: 
In many states, the fear of fissiparous politics and potential state 
fragmentation created an overwhelming emphasis on ‘national unity’, 
which rejected discourses of ‘difference’, in theory, if not always in 
practice. [ ] Stability trumped representativeness or accountability.45 
 
Usually, this suppressed internal citizenship conflicts despite “fragmented multi-ethnic 
and multi-linguistic populations” and allowed for a new, singular identity to solidify.46 
 Mahmood Mamdani theorized that the bifurcated state during colonialism laid the 
foundation for how post-colonial states reconciled racialized and tribalized societies. 
Mamdani argues that the “native question,” or how a “foreign minority” can “rule over an 
indigenous majority,” led to the creation of the bifurcated state in colonized areas.47 The 
bifurcated state was comprised of centralized direct rule (which focused on the imported 
“civilized” laws of Europe and did not recognize “native institutions”) and decentralized 
indirect rule (where “the tribal leadership was either selectively reconstituted as the 
hierarchy of the local state or freshly imposed where none had existed”).48 Direct rule 
became the “urban civil power” that excluded “natives from civil freedoms” that citizens 
enjoyed while indirect rule became a “rural tribal authority” that included “natives into a 
                                                 
43 Dorman, “Citizenship in Africa,” 161-162. 
44 Dorman, “Citizenship in Africa,” 162. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 16. 
48 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 17. 
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state-enforced customary order.”49 The urban civil power (under direct rule) promised to 
protect rights while the rural customary power (under indirect rule) promised to protect 
tradition.50  
 The bifurcated state of urban civil power and rural customary power is further 
differentiated by divisions between racism and tribalism. Mamdani writes: 
The history of civil society in colonial Africa is laced with racism…for 
civil society was first and foremost the society of the colons. Also, it was 
primarily a creation of the colonial state. The rights of free association and 
free publicity, and eventually of political representation, were the rights of 
citizens under direct rule, not of subjects indirectly ruled by a customarily 
organized tribal authority. Thus, whereas civil society was racialized, 
Native Authority was tribalized.51 
 
Mamdani defines “Native Authority” as the hierarchy of chiefs appointed by the indirect 
rule of colonialism which reorganized customary rule (which historically was divided by 
age groups, religious groups, clans, etc.) into a singular, despotic rule.52 
 Post-independence, the state held a powerful position conceptualizing identity and 
citizenship as an authoritative entity.53 The state’s democratization objective, according 
to Mamdani, required “deracializing civil society [and] detribalizing the Native 
Authority.” While independence usually deracialized the government, civil society 
remained racialized without further state action, such as affirmative action and 
redistribution policies.54 However, while affirmative action policies “unified victims of 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 18. 
51 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 19. 
52 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 655. 
53 Neville Alexander, “Ten Years After Apartheid: The State of Nation-Building in South Africa,” in 
Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa, ed. Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett, 
and Peter Nugent, 197-219 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 204. 
54 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 20. 
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colonial racism,” the redistribution process highlighted ethnic divisions, which in turn 
reinforced the tribalized Native Authority.55  
 Colonial oppression was understood as “an exclusion from civil society, and more 
generally as alien rule.”56 Efforts to redress imperialism and deracialize society did not 
touch the tribalized local powers, however. “The tribal logic of Native Authorities easily 
overwhelmed the democratic logic of civil society” as politics combined the two spheres. 
The successful politician would “represent citizens in civil society, but also dominate 
other subjects through the appointment of chiefs in the Native Authority.”57  
Additionally, politicians, intent on consolidating power, place the state in a 
position to create a new sense of belonging through “strategic and exclusionary 
nationalism.”58 The state’s backing of political identity benefits the state by providing a 
scapegoat for citizen’s hardships and scarce resources.59 Dorman writes: 
While political and economic liberalisation constitute the current 
configuration against which identity politics are played out, the interaction 
of local and global influences threaten the survival of a state-level national 
identity and gives urgency to elite attempts to retain power through the 
moulding of citizenship. As these pressures increase citizens seek, and are 
encouraged, to rally around a national identity which retrenches the 
benefits afforded by the state against the external hordes. These political 
pressures contribute to the emergence of discourses of inclusion and 
exclusion – the ‘us’ and ‘them’ – which then forms the basis of a strategic 
and exclusionary nationalism.60 
 
The state therefore uses foreign nationals to reinforce its own power, and unite citizens 
under a shared identity and belonging. Immigration policy is one method to accomplish 
                                                 
55 Ibid.  
56 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 289. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Dorman, Hammett, and Nugent, Making Nations, Creating Strangers States and Citizenship in Africa, 8. 
59 Alexander, “Ten Years After Apartheid,” 204.; See also Dorman, Hammett and Nugent, Making Nations, 
Creating Strangers States and Citizenship in Africa, 10. 
60 Dorman, Hammett and Nugent, Making Nations, Creating Strangers States and Citizenship in Africa, 9. 
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nation-building because its treatment of immigrants “conveys powerful ideas about the 
self-image of the destination state.”61 
 
 
Politics of Belonging in South Africa 
 
 In South Africa, the transition to democracy and a new constitution deracialized 
the state, but retained the Native Authority system, which continued one aspect of 
apartheid and colonial rule.62 In fact, the African National Congress (the party of 
Mandela and the forefront opposition to apartheid’s ruling National Party), could only 
connect the urban and rural spheres (which was required for a successful transition out of 
apartheid rule) through “tribal logic” and an intertribal alliance with the chiefs of the 
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa.63 This compromise secured the 
importance of customary tribalism and ethnic division in the democratic South Africa. 
 The importance of internal divisions within South Africa, however, is fluid and 
determined by external pressures. Dorman noted: 
The transition to democracy in South Africa challenged the foundation of 
every aspect of social, political, and economic life in the apartheid period 
– racial identity. The social hierarchy which ingrained notions of 
superiority and inferiority, and formed the basis of the inclusion or 
exclusion of groups economically, politically and spatially supposedly 
came to an end in 1994. Government policies of redress have sought to 
mitigate historical inequalities, but…[n]on-racialism, ‘the founding myth 
of the new South African nation’, has failed and racial identities remain 
vital in the new South Africa. At the same time, chauvinistic nationalism 
readily overcomes these differences when perceived threats to the 
economic and social security of South Africans appear. New and old 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion overlap as a latent national identity 
is expressed against (black) immigrants.64 
                                                 
61 Sally Peberdy, "Imagining Immigration: Inclusive Identities and Exclusive Policies in Post-1994 South 
Africa." Africa Today 48, no. 3 (2001), 16, doi: 10.2979/AFT.2001.48.3.14. 
62 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 32. 
63 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 293-294. 
64 Dorman, Hammett and Nugent, Making Nations, Creating Strangers States and Citizenship in Africa, 15. 
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This “latent national identity” is built on the “divided but shared history” of apartheid, 
and the shared experience of apartheid has become the tool to “identify true ‘South 
African.’”65 This exclusionary identity is demonstrated by the prevalence of xenophobia 
displayed by South Africans.66  
Part of this exclusionary identity originates from the apartheid era and continues 
in South Africa today. Under the apartheid government, educational institutions and the 
media did not consider South Africa to be “African”.67 Indeed, the perceived separation 
was promoted through news reports “about ‘hordes’, ‘barbarians’ and the links between 
immigration, crime and unemployment.”68 Since the democratization of South Africa, 
many South Africans are still reluctant to identify as African, with 28.4 percent of black 
South Africans considering themselves to be African.69 Additionally, South Africans 
view migrants as “threats to jobs, housing, education and health care” that the relatively 
new government struggles to provide to citizens.70  
The state also built on apartheid’s exclusionary laws and implementation of those 
laws. As Michael Neocosmos states, new laws criminalized migration while continuing 
apartheid’s practices.71 This combination “enabled state arbitrariness towards ‘foreigners’ 
through the excessive power provided to state personnel and the reproduction of racism 
                                                 
65 Peberdy, “Imagining Immigration,” 27. 
66 Dorman, Hammett and Nugent, Making Nations, Creating Strangers States and Citizenship in Africa, 15. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Carol Adjai and Gabriella Lazaridis, “Migration, Xenophobia and New Racism in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa,” International Journal of Social Science Studies 1, no. 1 (2013): 194, 
https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v1i1.102. 
70 Adjai and Lazaridis, “Migration, Xenophobia and New Racism in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” 198. 
71 Michael Neocosmos, From 'foreign Natives' to 'native Foreigners' Explaining Xenophobia in Post-
apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and Nationalism, Identity and Politics (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2010), 72.; 
See also Beth Whitaker, "Citizens and Foreigners: Democratization and the Politics of Exclusion in 
Africa," African Studies Review 48, no. 1 (2005): 118. 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.uoregon.edu/stable/20065047; See also Peberdy, “Imagining Immigration.” 
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in a modified form.” 72 The “inherited racism” of the state is demonstrated by the 
selective nature of the most extreme forms of xenophobia only targeting Africans and not 
Westerners.”73 The state’s actions reinforces and focuses the exclusion of who is 
“allowed” to be called “them” – black African immigrants.74 
  
                                                 
72 Neocosmos, From ‘Foreign Natives’ to ‘Native Foreigners,’ 72; See generally Adjai and Lazaridis. 
“Migration, Xenophobia and New Racism in Post-Apartheid South Africa.” 
73 Neocosmos, From ‘Foreign Natives’ to ‘Native Foreigners,’ 72. 
74 Dorman, Hammett and Nugent, Making Nations, Creating Strangers States and Citizenship in Africa, 
16.; See generally Neocosmos, From ‘Foreign Natives’ to ‘Native Foreigners.’ 
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CHAPTER III 
 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 South Africa is a member of the United Nations and the African Union. As a 
member of these two international bodies and as a signatory to treaties, conventions, and 
protocols concerning refugees, the country has a legal commitment to protect and uphold 
refugees’ rights. Furthermore, South Africa has a body of domestic law advancing the 
rights of everyone within the country’s borders as well as the rights and responsibilities 
of asylum seekers and refugees. 
 
 
International Definitions of Refugee 
 
The United Nations (UN) first defined the term “refugee” in the 1951 Convention 
Relating to Status of Refugees. The UN defines a refugee as a person who, “owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion” is forced to flee his or her 
country.75 This definition requires that the individual seeking refugee status must prove 
that his or her flight was directly caused by imminent fear of persecution. Additionally, a 
refugee cannot rely on their country of origin to provide protection, and requires a second 
country to ensure his or her basic human rights.76  
            The Organization of African Unity77 (OAU) expanded on the United Nation’s 
definition of a refugee in the 1969 Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (Refugee Convention). The OAU kept the UN definition of a refugee 
                                                 
75 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, art. 1. 
76 Id. 
77 The Organization of African Unity was replaced by the African Union in 2002. “AU in a Nutshell,” The 
African Union Commission, http://www.au.int/web/en/au-nutshell. 
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as someone fleeing his or her country of origin to escape persecution as a member of a 
certain group, but extended the definition to include other motivations as well. These 
motivations include “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin.”78 
The OAU’s expanded definition of refugee came from a strong sense of solidarity with 
freedom fighters who were fighting against colonial rule during liberation movements 
across Africa.79 In practice today, however, the term “disruption of public order” has 
been applied most often to circumstances “of internal security or stability of society.”80  
 
International Principles of Refugee Law 
 
 The first international principle discussed in this paper is progressive realization, 
which hinges on available resources. Progressive realization is defined as “the obligation 
to progressively and constantly move towards the full realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights, within the resources available to a State, including regional and 
international aid.”81 This requires countries to “implement a reasonable and measurable 
plan, including set achievable benchmarks and timeframes, for the enjoyment over time 
of economic, social and cultural rights within the resources available to the state party.”82 
Countries do have an obligation to “take concrete and targeted steps to realise economic, 
                                                 
78 African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 
1001 U.N.T.S. 45, art. 1. http://www.achpr.org/instruments/refugee-convention/. 
79 George Okoth-Obbo, "Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa," Refugee Survey Quarterly 20, no. 1 
(2001): 111. 
80 Alice Edwards, "Refugee Status Determination in Africa," African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 14, no. 2 (2006): 217. 
81 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Oct. 24, 
2011, art. 2, ¶ 13, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/economic-social-cultural/ 
82 Id. 
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social and cultural rights” with “the essential needs of members of vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups […] prioritized in all resource allocation processes.”83 
While the AU Charter does not explicitly include progressive realization, the 
doctrine is implied and widely used when interpreting social-economic rights.84 The 
South African Constitutional Court famously applied the progressive realization doctrine 
in Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others.85 
The Grootboom case held that as long as “reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources” had been taken to “achieve the progressive realisation of 
the right”, then the country had fulfilled its obligations.86 In determining if the country’s 
actions were reasonable, the question should not be “whether other or more desirable or 
favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been 
better spent.”87 Instead, the country could take a range of actions that would be 
considered reasonable, as there is no one correct course of action that would be 
reasonable.88 This gives immense discretion to the government in deciding when a 
shortage of resources exists and the best way to allocate those resources. 
The second international principle is non-refoulement, which protects refugees 
against forced return to the country or region of persecution. Article 33 Section 1 of the 
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees forbids States to 
                                                 
83 Id. at ¶ 14. 
84 Id. at ¶ 13. 
85 The Grootboom case was a landmark decision in South Africa concerning the positive right to housing. 
In this decision, the South African Constitutional Court held that although the government had the positive 
duty to ensure housing, the government did not have to fulfill this promise if it had taken proactive steps 
towards progressive realization. 
86 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, 2001 (1) SA 46, at ¶ 
14. 
87 Id. at ¶ 41. 
88 Id. 
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“expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened."89 The principle’s purpose is to 
protect refugees and asylum seekers (until determined to not hold a genuine refugee 
claim) from continued exposure to persecution, but it alone does not create a 
responsibility on the members to accept or provide additional rights or resources to the 
protected individuals.90 
Similarly, the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa of 1969 adheres to the principle of non-refoulement. Article II Section 
3 states that: 
No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as 
rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to 
return or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty 
would be threatened for the reasons set out in [the definitions of a 
refugee].91 
 
While the Convention does not explicitly discuss non-refoulement, the document does 
bind members to the commitment not to return vulnerable persons to persecution.  
 
 
South African Constitution of 1996 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 established democratic 
South Africa. The constitution, and in particular the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2, is the 
cornerstone of South Africa’s strong human rights foundation. The commitment to 
human rights is demonstrated in the first founding provision in Chapter 1, which states 
                                                 
89 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1A(2), 189 U.N.T.S. 137; See also 
Protocol I Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
90 James Hathaway, "Leveraging Asylum," Texas International Law Journal 45, no. 3 (2010): 504-505. 
91 African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 
1001 U.N.T.S. 45, art. 1. 
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that South Africa is founded on “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms.”92  
Furthermore, Chapter 2 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution of 1996, also 
known as the Bill of Rights, details a list of human rights protected by the constitution. 
Section 7(1) states that the bill of rights "enshrines the rights of all people in our country 
and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom."93 The bill of 
rights generally applies to and protects all persons physically within the borders of South 
Africa, not just citizens. 94 However, the bill of rights can be limited within the individual 
sections and by Section 36.  
The first right listed in the Bill of Rights and relevant to asylum law is equality. 
Subsection 9(1) states that "everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law."95 The provision continues to specifically state that the 
government "may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone" based 
on race, ethnic or social origin, or color, among other grounds.96 The following section 
protects human dignity, stating that "everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have 
their dignity respected and protected."97 This language is not limited by Section 36 or 
elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, nor does it restrict protection to only citizens. These 
constitutional protections extend to anyone physically present within the country. 
The second relevant right is found in Section 21, which provides freedom of 
movement and residence.98 Subsection (3) provides that every citizen has the additional 
                                                 
92 S. Afr. Const., 1996 § 1(a). 
93 Id. at § 7(1). 
94 Id. at § 7(3). 
95 Id. at § 9. 
96 Id. at § 9(3). 
97 Id. at § 10. 
98 Id. at § 21(1). 
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right to enter and reside anywhere in the country.99  While this right is specifically given 
to citizens, it is not an exclusionary right stating only citizens have the right to enter the 
country or reside in South Africa. Instead, its existence is to ensure all citizens, regardless 
of race, have the freedom to enter and move around the country freely as citizens, without 
restrictions as many lived with under apartheid. 
The fourth relevant right grants everyone access to food, water, and social 
security.100 However, subsections 27(2)-(3) provides for the state to progressively realize 
these rights, as resources allow, with the exception of access to emergency medical 
care.101 Section 27 is not limited to citizens, as everyone physically within the country 
has the right to access. However, these rights are limited in that only access is ensured, 
and not the actual services. The section also specifically states that these rights are 
limited by progressive realization and the availability of resources. This means that 
hospitals and healthcare providers may charge for their services and services can be 
withheld until payment is rendered (other than emergency medical services). However, 
treatment cannot be withheld based on other grounds (such as citizenship status). 
Therefore, money may be a barrier to treatment, but access itself is protected. 
The fifth right provides all persons the right to “a basic education, including adult 
basic education.”102 Subsection 29(1)(b) limits the right to “further education” based on 
the availability and accessibility of resources as per progressive realization. While non-
basic education is therefore limited, basic education, regardless of the student’s age or 
availability of resources, is guaranteed to everyone.  
                                                 
99 Id. at § 21(3).  
100 Id. at § 27(1). 
101 Id. at §§ 27(2)-(3).  
102 Id. at § 29(1)(a).  
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The sixth relevant right is just administrative action found in Section 33. 
Subsection 33(1) provides that administrative action must be “lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair."103 Additionally, any person whose rights have been "adversely 
affected" by administrative action has the right to a written explanation.104 This right is 
not limited by progressive realization. 
Section 36 permits rights within the Bill of Rights to be limited in some instances. 
The rights may only be limited “in terms of law of general applications” if “the limitation 
is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.”105 Furthermore, the limitation must consider “all relevant factors” 
which include:  
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.106  
 
Therefore, while rights may be limited, the constitution requires the limitation meet a 
high reasonableness standard. 
 Finally, the constitution confirms that when interpreting the Bill of rights, one 
“must promote the values” that found South Africa “based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom.”107 Additionally, one must “consider international law” when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights.108 Thus, the highest law in South Africa requires the interpretation of 
                                                 
103 Id. at § 33(1). 
104 Id. at § 33(2).  
105 Id. at § 36(1). 
106 Id. at § 36(1). 
107 Id. at § 39(1)(a). 
108 Id. at § 39(1)(a). 
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rights provided to all persons within the country to regard human rights and international 
law. 
 
South African Refugee and Immigration Law 
 The South African domestic legislation governing the asylum application process 
and refugee rights is the Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998 (Refugees Act) and the 
Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002 (Immigration Act). The Refugees Act was amended in 
2008 and again in 2017. The 2017 amendment will be analyzed later in this study, and the 
text of the Refugees Act will not be analyzed in full in this section.  
 The Refugees Act preamble refers to South Africa’s commitment to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa. The Act itself also reconfirms the country’s commitment to 
international law and human rights, in particular refugee rights. 
 Similarly, the Refugees Amendment Act No. 33 of 2008 inserted a new section, 
Section 1A, to the Refugees Act. This section states: 
1A. This Act must be interpreted and applied in a manner that is consistent with – 
(a) the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; 
(b) the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees; 
(c) the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; 
(d) the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human rights; and 
(e) any domestic law or other relevant convention or international agreement 
to which the Republic is or becomes a party.109 
 
                                                 
109 Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008 §1A.  
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This section again reaffirms the two conventions and the protocol that the original Act 
affirmed, but also recognizes South Africa’s commitment to the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948. Again, this is consistent with legal obligation to protect refugees 
and abide by international law. 
The Immigration Act does not legislate the asylum system in South Africa. 
However, the act does provide that an asylum transit permit may be issued “to a person 
who at a port of entry claims to be an asylum seeker, which permit shall be valid for a 
period of fourteen days only."110 Though rarely enforced, this measure allows for an 
individual who enters South Africa at a formal point of entry without a valid immigration 
document to inform the authorities that he or she has an asylum claim and receive a 
temporary transit permit. This permit grants legal stay within the country while the 
individual reports to a refugee reception office. Once the individual reports to the refugee 
reception office to lodge his or her asylum claim, the Refugees Act of 1998 replaces the 
Immigration Act as the governing legislation of that individual's continued presence in 
South Africa. 
 
  
                                                 
110 Immigration Act 13 of 2002 § 21(3). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ASYLUM PROCESS 
 
Asylum Overview 
 
The DHA is the South African institution that implements the country’s refugee 
laws and manages the asylum process. In 2016,111 the DHA reported 35,377 total new 
asylum applications made at Refugee Reception Offices (RROs) throughout the 
country.112 This number is consistent with a continuing trend of declining applications in 
the country since 2009.113 In 2010, the DHA reported a sharp drop to only 124,336 
applications (almost 100,000 applications fewer than 2009).114 By 2012, new applications 
dropped below 100,000 applications.115 The next sharpest drop occurred between 2015 
and 2016, when applications declined almost by half from 62,159 to the current 35,377 
new applications.116 
The DHA presents its data for new applications by the asylum seeker’s country of 
origin, gender, and age group.  According to the DHA’s 2016 statistics, the majority of 
new arrivals were from Zimbabwe (22.5 percent), the Democratic Republic of Congo (15 
percent), Ethiopia (13.4 percent), Nigeria (9.2 percent), Bangladesh (8 percent), Somalia 
and Malawi (both 4.6 percent), Burundi (3.3 percent), Pakistan (3.1 percent), and Ghana 
                                                 
111 2016 is the most recent publication of asylum statistics. The DHA defines the 2016 year as the calendar 
year from January to December. 
112 Immigration Services, 2016 Asylum Report for UNHCR, Department of Home Affairs, 2017. 
113 The DHA reported a peak number of applications totaling 223,324 in 2009. See Immigration Services, 
2016 Asylum Report for UNHCR. 
114 Ibid. 
115 This is partially due to the creation of the Zimbabwean Documentation Project, which created a pathway 
to regularized documentation for Zimbabweans without proper documents. There were few requirements 
and applicants only needed to possess a valid passport. See Roni Amit, All Roads Lead to Rejections: 
Persistent Bias and Incapacity in South African Refugee Status Determination (Johannesburg: African 
Centre for Migration Studies. 2012), 14. 
116 Immigration Services, 2016 Asylum Report for UNHCR. 
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(3 percent).117 Of the 35,377 new asylum seekers, 72.4 percent were men and 27.6 
percent were women. The majority (74 percent) of the new applicants were “young 
adults”, defined as ages 19-35.118 The remaining 25 percent of new applicants were 
almost evenly split between minors and adults aged 36-65.119  
While the DHA reports the number of new applications and the number of initial 
status decisions each year, not all of the decisions in a yearly report correspond to a new 
application in the same year. This is largely due to delays in the decision process or 
submission timing of new applications at the end of a year. Therefore, the statistics for 
new applications and decisions made in a year are not consistent. The initial decision is 
made by a Refugee Status Determination Officer (RSDO) after an interview. The DHA 
reported 41,241 RSDO decisions in 2016. Nationwide, RSDOs approved and granted 
refugee status to 7.6 percent of asylum applications.120 Conversely, RSDOs decided 52.6 
percent applications were “Unfounded” and 40 percent were rejected as “Manifestly 
Unfounded” and “Fraudulent.”121 Comparatively, the United States and the European 
Union granted refugee status to asylum applicants at rates of 11.3 percent and 61 percent, 
respectively, in the same year.122 
The RSDO must make a status determination following an interview with the 
asylum seeker. During the decision process, the RSDO must consider the asylum seeker’s 
credibility, country of origin information, and relevant international and domestic law. 
                                                 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Nadwa Mossaad and Ryan Baugh, “Refugees and Asylees: 2016,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2018; European Asylum Support Office, Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the 
European Union 2016. EASO, 2017. 
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An Unfounded decision means that the RSDO determines that the asylum seeker's claim 
does not fully meet the required elements of refugee status. The Unfounded decision is a 
rejection, however it is a "soft" rejection in that the decision is not accompanied with an 
order to leave the country. A Manifestly Unfounded decision means that the RSDO 
determines the asylum seeker’s claim does not comprise any elements of a refugee claim 
(e.g., the asylum seeker voluntarily left his or her country in order to find a better paying 
job or study at university). A Fraudulent decision means that the RSDO believes the 
asylum seeker lied or engaged in fraud when lodging his or her asylum claim. 
If an asylum seeker receives a Manifestly Unfounded or Fraudulent decision, the 
application is sent to the Standing Committee for Refugees Affairs (SCRA) for automatic 
review. In 2016, SCRA reviewed 31,426 RSDO decisions. SCRA Upheld 75 percent of 
the RSDOs’ decisions; Final Rejections and orders to leave the country are issued to the 
failed asylum seeker. For the remaining 25 percent, SCRA Set Aside or Referred the 
decision back to the RSDO. 123 These applications effectively re-enter the asylum 
process124, and the asylum seeker may then lodge an appeal with the Refugee Appeal 
Board (RAB). 
The RAB is currently facing a very large backlog. The backlog is the consequence 
of several factors including a court-ordered change in procedure (resulting in many 
invalid decisions that now require new hearings),125 the high number of applications 
                                                 
123 Immigration Services, 2016 Asylum Report for UNHCR. 
124 One third of all RSDO decisions are Unfounded decisions. See Immigration Services, 2016 Asylum 
Report for UNHCR. 
125 The court in Harerimana v Chairperson of the RAB and others held that the RAB must sit in quorum to 
hear and decide cases. The DHA (although contested by some members of civil society) this order to mean 
that the majority of the Board nationally (no less than three) must be present for each hearing. This prevents 
the DHA from creating an RRO-specific RAB, because each hearing must have a majority of all members 
nationally, regardless of location. Therefore, there is only one RAB nationwide, and they hear every case. 
See Harerimana v Chairperson of the Refugee Appeal Board and Others 2014 (5) SA 550 (WCC) (Saflii). 
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whose status determination is essentially deferred by the RSDO, and the inoperable status 
of the RAB due to personnel shifts.126 The resulting backlog, according to the Minister of 
Home Affairs in March 2017, consists of 258,232 asylum seekers waiting for an appeal 
hearing with the RAB.127 In 2016, the RAB heard a total of 63 appeals, and finalized 
1,296 decisions.128 However, as the Minister noted, these numbers are impacted by the 
RAB’s inability to hear any cases since May 2016 and an unknown number of hearings in 
which the “RAB was improperly constituted.”129 The estimated wait time for an appeal 
hearing is 5-10 years, but it is important to note that some asylum seekers have been 
waiting for as long as 18 years for a hearing.130 Relying on the backlog numbers and 
estimated hearing schedule from the Minister’s response and assuming the RAB can sit 
for hearings 50 weeks out of the year, the RAB will clear the backlog in 103.3 years.131 
 
 
Challenges in the System 
 
Asylum seekers face many barriers throughout the asylum process. Asylum 
seekers report a variety of difficulties in not only procedural aspects in applying for 
asylum, but also substantive challenges in completing the application. The DHA’s 
internal policies relating to RSDOs and initial decisions creates barriers to just 
administrative action for asylum seekers. Finally, administrative decisions and 
procedures of the RROs result in violations to just administrative action as well. 
                                                 
126 The RAB chairperson’s contract ended and three Board members resigned in mid-2016. The RAB did 
not begin operations until February 2017. See Minister of Home Affairs, “Question NW267 to the Minister 
of Home Affairs.” 
127 Minister of Home Affairs, “Question NW267 to the Minister of Home Affairs.” 
128 Immigration Services. 2016 Asylum Report for UNHCR. Department of Home Affairs, 2017. 
129 Minister of Home Affairs, “Question NW267 to the Minister of Home Affairs.” 
130 According to client data from the Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town. 
131 Minister of Home Affairs, “Question NW267 to the Minister of Home Affairs.” 
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 As previously mentioned, the first step in the asylum process is lodging an asylum 
claim at an RRO. Many asylum seekers, however, are not aware of asylum laws or 
policies, and instead make their way to cities to reunite with friends, family, and other 
asylum seekers.132 Without proper documents, asylum seekers are vulnerable to arrests 
and deportation proceedings. For example, a group of 19 Ethiopians recently arrived in 
South Africa after fleeing political persecution (they were members and supporters of an 
opposition party) and ignorant of asylum law, traveled to Johannesburg.133 They never 
encountered an immigration official at the Mozambique-South African border.134 There, 
they met a Somali national with whom they shared a language, and he offered them 
shelter and food.135 While at the Somali’s house, an unrelated fight broke out which 
brought the police.136 The police arrested the Ethiopians for not having proper 
immigration documents, and the DHA began deportation proceedings.137 The DHA 
argued before the Supreme Court of Appeals that the Ethiopian’s reluctance to discuss 
the specifics of their persecution and refusal to seek asylum in another country before 
entering South Africa should be held against the would-be asylum seekers.138 
Additionally, the DHA asserted that the department had no “legal obligation… to 
transport any person being detained, pending deportation, to a refugee reception office, to 
enable an application for asylum to be made.”139 While the Court disagreed and ordered 
                                                 
132 Information reported during confidential client consultations. 
133 Bula and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2012, (2) SA 1 (SCA) at ¶ 4-5. 
134 Id. at ¶ 4. 
135 Id. at ¶ 5. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at ¶ 6. 
138 Id. at ¶ 18. 
139 Id. at ¶ 20. 
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the DHA to allow the group to apply for asylum, this case demonstrates the DHA’s 
opinion of its role and obligations to assist would-be asylum seekers. 
 Furthermore, asylum seekers report challenges when applying for asylum at the 
RRO. These challenges include gaining access to the RRO itself. The few RRO locations, 
combined with the large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees requiring services at the 
RROs, results in very long lines. These lines can be so long, that 75 percent of 
responding asylum seekers in a 2012 study reported spending at least two nights outside 
the RRO to secure a spot in the line.140 Once in the line, 19 percent reported that he or she 
was asked by an employee (usually a security guard) for money to move up in the line, 
and some were turned away from the RRO if he or she refused to pay.141 Towards the end 
of the calendar year, new applicants are sometimes turned away with the explanation that 
the RRO is “fully booked” and no longer receiving new applications until the following 
year.142  
 Once the asylum seeker successfully enters the RRO, however, he or she often 
face substantive challenges to applying for asylum. The application form is only available 
in English, and RSDOs and interpreters do not always provide assistance or inform 
asylum seekers of their rights as the Refugees Act stipulates.143 In fact, almost 50 percent 
of asylum seekers reported that the RSDO never explained the process, and 40 percent 
reported they did not understand what information the RSDO expected the asylum seeker 
                                                 
140 Roni Amit, No Way In: Barriers to Access, Service and Administrative Justice as South Africa’s 
Refugee Receptions Offices (Johannesburg: African Centre for Migration Studies, 2012), 42. 
141 Amit, No Way In, 56. 
142 This information was reported during confidential client consultations and through communications with 
RRO personnel. 
143 See A v Chairperson of the Refugee Appeal Board and Others, No. 19483/2015, 2017 ZAWCHC 
(Saflii). 
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to provide or prove.144 The RSDO’s failure to provide asylum seekers with this 
information jeopardizes the asylum seeker’s ability to provide all relevant information, 
either because he or she does not understand the import of such information, or because 
the asylum seeker is reluctant to freely share information he or she fears will make its 
way back to his or her persecutor(s).145 Some asylum seekers knowingly refrain from 
disclosing relevant information because he or she is afraid to disclose certain facts of his 
or her claim. For example, some LGBT asylum seekers are afraid to disclose their sexual 
orientation in front of an interpreter from their country of origin and connected to the 
asylum seeker community in South Africa, and some asylum seekers who have 
experienced sexual violence are too traumatized to discuss their experiences with 
strangers.146 
 DHA’s internal policies for RSDOs also create barriers. First, there is no 
standardized set of qualifications to become a RSDO.147 This means that RSDOs do not 
have a uniform minimum education or even background in refugee issues before hiring. 
In addition to a lack of qualifications, the DHA created an internal review policy 
(intended to combat corruption) that only initiates an automatic review on decisions 
granting refugee status.148 The lopsided review process encourages RSDO to reject 
asylum seekers to avoid reviews, and one asylum seeker reported that when he received 
his Unfounded decision, the RSDO advised him that he qualified for refugee status and 
                                                 
144 Amit, No Way In, 65. 
145 In confidential client consultations, asylum seekers reported hearing rumors that information asylum 
seekers give in interviews and on the application form is shared with state agents from the asylum seeker’s 
country of origin. Others reported not knowing their applications are kept confidential. 
146 Information reported in confidential client consultations.  
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the RAB would grant him status.149 Another asylum seeker, a Somali, fleeing the war 
back home, received a Fraudulent decision from the RSDO who reasoned that because he 
had never heard of any conflict in Somalia, the asylum seeker’s claim could only be an 
attempt to fraudulently gain a work permit in South Africa.150   
 Moreover, RSDOs, whether through a lack of training or incentive properly assess 
claims, also frequently fail to correctly apply law when determining refugee status. When 
determining status, RSDOs must consider international law, the South African 
Constitution, the Refugees Act, and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 
2000 (which ensures administrative justice). RSDOs often consult the UNHCR’s 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Status Determining Refugee Status as well as 
refugee law scholars such as James Hathaway for interpretations of the legal definitions, 
burden of proof (which primarily falls upon the applicant to proof he or she has a refugee 
claim, but the examiner shares some responsibility gather and evaluate all of the 
evidence),151 credibility of the asylum seeker, standard of proof, among other guidelines. 
RSDOs also consider country of origin information, which includes background research 
on the country of origin’s safety and stability.   
 An example of an RSDO’s failure to correctly apply the law is laid out in 
Mwamba v Chairperson of the Refugee Appeal Board and Others. Mr. Mwamba 
Mununga Armand, a Congolese asylum seeker in this matter, was a social worker for the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’s government.152 Mr. Mwamba was transferred to Goma, 
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the center of First Congo War, to assist with orphaned children from the war (which 
ended around the time of the transfer).153 Mr. Mwamba split his time working in Goma 
and a nearby village until anti-Kabila rebels occupied the village.154 He was held in the 
village until managing to escape to Goma six months later.155 However, Mr. Mwamba 
was repeatedly arrested by government agents under suspicion of involvement with the 
rebel group, and alleged he was assaulted while detained and fellow detainees 
disappeared.156 Eventually, he escaped detention with the help of one of the state agents, 
and made his way to South Africa. In his application, Mr. Mwamba said he “in insecurity 
at any time and anywhere on my own country (sic).”157 He testified that he was not 
offered an interpreter or assistance to complete the application form or during the 
interview, and that during the interview the RSDO did not seem interested in his reasons 
for leaving his country.158 Furthermore, Mr. Mwamba, who was not advised on the 
asylum process, testified he was afraid his “capture, imprisonment and assault at the 
hands of government forces” would “jeopardise his application” and so did not disclose it 
to the RSDO.159 
The reasons for the RSDO’s Unfounded decision follow:  
You claimed that you were born in Sadoa village in Katoa province and 
you were studying in Lubumbashi from 1987 to 2003. You also mentioned 
that you were working in Goma from 1998 to 2008. You have decided to 
leave your country because you were arrested by the rebels for six months 
30Km from Goma. You again mentioned that after fleeing the rebels you 
were than accused of working for the rebels by the secret service. After 
considering all the relevant fact into your application I have come into 
conclusion that you claim does not call to question any material fact and 
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country of information is not consistent on this matter because it is 
unlikely that you can study in Lubumbashi from 1987 to 2003 (sixteen 
years) and again to be able to work in Goma from 1998 to 2008 (ten years) 
eveven though it is fact that the political instability and insecurity in 
Goma. You could also go back to your place of birth Katanga which is 
peacefull and under government control. Inlight of the above well founded 
fear does not apply. (sic)160 
 
The judge in the Mwamba case noted the RSDO failed to give Mr. Mwamba the benefit 
of the doubt as well as to “properly undertaken an inquisitorial role.”161 
Even after completing the application, asylum seekers continue to experience 
barriers throughout the asylum process, specifically in terms of family joining and 
application processing. Family joining refers to the process of joining dependents 
(usually children under 18 years old and spouses, but in exceptional cases an infirm 
parent) to a primary file held by an asylum seeker or refugee. Joining files can be 
beneficial in that it streamlines the application process for a family, allows children to 
receive asylum permits (children cannot legally lodge an independent claim for asylum 
until the age of 18, yet every foreign national, regardless of age, requires immigration or 
asylum documents), and all dependents receive the same legal benefits as the primary file 
holder. This means that if the primary file holder is a refugee, then every dependent also 
has a refugee permit (which is valid for four years at a time, instead of a few months), 
access to social grants and travel documents, and is eligible for Permanent Residency 
after five years. To determine dependency relationships, the DHA relies on family 
members listed in the original application, DNA test results, biometrics, and government 
issued documents such as birth and marriage certificates.  
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The DHA relies most heavily on the original application. The DHA is highly 
suspicious of applications for dependents who do not appear on the primary file holder’s 
application:  
Where a recognised refugee did not specify on his or her [Application] 
that he or she was married or had children, this raises a prima facie 
concern about the validity of the claim of his or her purported spouse or 
child…the Department cannot grant dependents, refugee status in the 
absence of sufficient information, particularly, in respect of those who are 
alleged to be children of recognised refugees. The Department must 
always be alert to the risks of child trafficking.162 
 
However, the DHA is also highly suspicious when names are spelled differently (a 
common occurrence for illiterate asylum seekers) or birth and marriage dates are 
incorrect.163 Additionally, sometimes family members are left out of the applications 
because of communication errors or incorrect beliefs that a family member is deceased.164 
The DHA’s concerns for trafficking, while understandable and in line with 
international law, also causes children to become undocumented. For example, a refugee 
reported that the DHA refused to join his child, born in South Africa and possessing a 
South African birth certificate, to his file because the DHA questioned the refugee’s 
marriage certificate to his wife.165 While the DHA did not question the validity of the 
birth certificate (which was issued by the DHA) and thus the child’s parentage, the DHA 
reasoned concerns for child trafficking prevented the DHA from joining the child to his 
father’s refugee file.  
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Furthermore, the DHA will not consider an application for family joining if the 
dependent did not specify that he or she intended to apply as a dependent. According to 
the Cape Town RRO manager: 
In addition, if a recognised refugee who had applied for asylum at the 
CTRRO, declared in his [Application] that he or she was married, but his 
or her spouse submits an independent application for asylum under section 
3(a) or (b) of the Act [these sections correspond to the UN and OAU 
definitions of refugee], the Department requires that application to be 
process to finality…If an applicant is permitted to apply for asylum under 
section 3(c) [this section allows for dependents to join a family member’s 
file] whilst his or her application under section 3(a) or (b) is pending, this 
would result in an unwarranted waste of resources spent dealing with the 
application submitted under section 3(a) or (b) of the Act.166 
 
This is problematic not only because the DHA assumes an asylum seeker is 
knowledgeable about the Refugees Act (especially when many asylum seekers have 
language barriers and do not receive proper assistance from the DHA when completing 
the application), but also because the application form never calls for the applicant to 
identify which definition his or her claim satisfies. While a dependent could use the 
asylum seeker permit until his or her claim is finalized (and if rejected then reapply as a 
dependent), the dependent will not have access to the benefits outlined above if the 
dependent is trying to join a refugee’s file.  
 The barriers to family joining are particularly burdensome for children. Many 
children do not have an independent asylum claim because they were too young to have 
been persecuted while still in their country of origin. In the cases where a child arrives in 
South Africa without an adult (because she was either separated from a parent during 
flight or is following a parent to South Africa) and whose parents either gave incorrect 
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details about the child or did not include the child in the application,167 are often left 
undocumented. However, even if the parent included the child in the original application, 
children are still at risk of being undocumented when department officials refuse to 
accept family joining applications (without giving reasons) or lose the application 
because applicants are not given a receipt or proof of application while awaiting a 
decision.168 Undocumented children are in a precarious legal status for deferred 
deportation, struggle to access healthcare, and are being turned away from schools as the 
DHA pressures all education institutions to require proof of legal status for all non-
citizens, despite the entitlement to a basic education provided by the Constitution.169 
 Finally, asylum seekers report difficulties in receiving documents and decisions 
within a reasonable timeframe. Asylum seekers and refugees are not granted access to an 
RRO unless renewing a permit or completing an application for travel documents or 
passports, permanent residency, etc.170 This results in long delays (especially for refugees 
who only renew permits once every four years) in receiving decisions and documents. 
Some asylum seekers and refugees report receiving decisions months or years after a 
decision was written, and many refugees report not receiving a passport until after it 
expired.171 Additionally decisions, especially from the RAB, are often written long after 
the interview or hearing occurred. Asylum seekers reported receiving a RAB decision 
that was written ten years after the hearing took place.172 
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 The various challenges in the asylum process have serious impacts on asylum 
seekers in South Africa. Many asylum seekers struggle to receive a permit in the first 
place and therefore are living in uncertainty. Almost two thirds (165,697) of asylum 
permits were expired as of March 2017.173 Many asylum seekers want to follow the law 
and keep their permits up to date, especially considering the negative implications of an 
expired permit (such as fines, invalid rights to work or study, and no proof of legal status 
within South Africa), but they find the hurdles insurmountable.174  
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CHAPTER V 
 
EVIDENCE 
 
This study explores the DHA’s approach to asylum through published policy 
papers, the 2017 amendment to the Refugees Act, and a Supreme Court case regarding 
the Cape Town RRO closure. First, the policy papers provide insight into the DHA’s 
understanding of its role in serving South Africa, the threats posed by international 
migration generally, and the inadequacies of the previous version of the Refugees Act. 
Throughout the papers, the DHA creates and reinforces ideas of who belongs in South 
Africa, and who should be excluded, all of which justify the need for the new 
amendment. Second, the new amendment, informed by the new policies, is the 
enforceable legislation managing the asylum system and creating legal means to act on 
the DHA’s policies. The new amendment, however, contains provisions that potentially 
violate international law and curb human rights protections. Third, the closure of the 
RRO and ensuing litigation demonstrates the DHA’s lack of commitment to human rights 
in its execution of legislation and policy. Supporting documentation providing context 
and clarification authored by officials within the DHA will be analyzed along with the 
main evidence.  
 
Policy Papers 
 
 Policy papers published by the DHA are the driving force behind legislation 
relating to immigration and asylum. The DHA first published its immigration policy 
framework in the 1997 Green Paper on International Migration and the 1999 White Paper 
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on International Migration.175 These papers influenced the Immigration Act and the new 
direction for immigration under a democratic government. Similarly, the 1998 Refugee 
White Paper became the basis for the Refugees Act later that same year. Importantly, the 
papers contend that apartheid era legislation could be kept, so long as parliament passed 
amendments that adapted the legislation to comply with the new constitution.176 The 
discriminatory policies benefiting white Europeans over Africans remained in place.  
 The DHA did not publish another finalized177 policy paper until the Discussion 
Paper on the Repositioning of the Department of Home Affairs (Repositioning Paper) in 
May 2017. The Repositioning Paper contextualizes the DHA’s wider mandate to manage 
identity and migration functions within the South African government. Two months later, 
The DHA published the White Paper on International Migration (WPIM) which outlines 
the DHA’s intentions for policy and legislation implementation regarding immigration 
and refugee frameworks.178 Both papers herald the DHA’s shift to securitization. 
The Repositioning Paper does not focus solely on migration issues because the 
DHA is responsible for more than managing the immigration and asylum systems. The 
department also serves South African citizens by maintaining identity records (for 
example, birth and death certificates, marriage registrations, etc.). As such, the 
Repositioning Paper seeks to correct the DHA’s perceived role within the government 
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from the “periphery” as merely an administrative and non-strategic department resulting 
from a lack of previous policy.179 In her Foreword, Minister of Home Affairs Hlengiwe 
Mkhize contextualizes the DHA’s role in South Africa in relation to national identity, 
economy, and migration: 
All South African citizens are dependent on the Department of Home 
Affairs (DHA) because of its sole mandate to secure and manage official 
identity and status. The DHA affirms our unique identity and our 
nationality… Over the past ten years the DHA has gone through a robust 
transformation process, which included re-thinking its mandate and the 
critical role it must play in building a capable state. The mandate of the 
department is now clearly understood as the use of its identity and 
migration functions to empower citizens; to enable economic development 
and efficient government; and to secure our country.180 
 
Additionally, the Repositioning Paper acknowledges the likely increase in mass 
migration due to wars and climate change, which will only result in increased pressures 
on the immigration branch of the department.181 Therefore, the Repositioning Paper’s 
broader focus on the DHA’s full mandate influences the department’s view on 
immigration, including the asylum system.  
 The WPIM includes much of the 1999 White Paper on International Migration, 
but the new WPIM improves the policy’s relevancy and addresses gaps in the policy.182 
As Minister Mkhize states in her forward, the WPIM was published to provide:  
[A] comprehensive review of the policy framework that can inform 
systematic reform to the legislation. Essentially, and despite significant 
changes in the country, region and world, the country’s formal 
international migration policy has remained in place since 1999. The 
policy is outdated and has serious limitations that affect the country’s 
ability to adequately embrace global opportunities while safeguarding our 
sovereignty and ensuring public safety and national security.183 
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Thus, the WPIM updates the DHA’s official policy towards international 
migration. 
 In the papers, the DHA explains its founding philosophy for realizing its mandate 
and identifies challenges in the immigration system generally (which influences the 
asylum system), as well as the need for changes to the asylum system. Specifically, the 
DHA contextualizes the policy through the need to protect South Africa’s sovereignty, 
protecting against external criminal threats, and ensuring the proper use of the asylum 
system. Further evidence of the DHA’s intent and reasoning come from speeches and 
presentations by department officials. 
 
Protecting South Africa 
 
A main concern for the DHA is protecting South Africa’s sovereignty and thus 
national identity. In 2016, Minister of Home Affairs Malusi Gigaba addressed civil 
society at a Dialogue on the Green Paper on International Migration on the need for new 
policy. He stated: 
South Africa has a sovereign right to manage international migration in its 
national interests… South Africa’s international migration policy must 
contribute to nation building and social cohesion. As mentioned earlier, 
the migration policy shapes the future composition of the South African 
population.184 
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As a sovereign state, South Africa does have a right to manage migration and legislate the 
asylum system. Minister Gigaba also points out the DHA is integral to building South 
Africa as its duties include determining who will become South African. 
The Repositioning Paper places the DHA as the protector of South African 
sovereignty through its role in managing identity. The paper emphasizes the need for the 
secure management of identity as an important tool to protect and determine citizenship. 
As DHA reasons, proper management protects South Africa from “threats to its people, 
systems, institutions and capacity to provide for the nation”185 An example of a threat 
would be the criminal use of false identities, which would have adverse effects on South 
African citizens and potentially the economy.186 Furthermore, identity is crucial to 
affirming citizenship and civil status. As the only institution mandated to “guard” 
citizenship, the DHA reasons that citizenship is paramount to maintaining national 
sovereignty: 
If there is no nation, populated by citizens as defined by law, then 
logically there can be no sovereign state. If South Africa loses its 
sovereignty, then everything else is lost, since decisions will be made 
elsewhere, as in the colonial era.187 
 
Strong legal constructs of who is South African therefore determine the country’s success 
as a political entity.  
 The DHA equates strong management of identity and thus citizenship with South 
Africa’s independence and success as a sovereign state. While the DHA refers to identity 
and citizenship as legal constructs, the policy papers influence the philosophical 
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(May 2017), 6. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Department of Home Affairs, Discussion Paper on the Repositioning of the Department of Home 
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understanding of who belongs in South Africa. By placing such a high importance on 
citizenship, the DHA reinforces the idea of “us” versus “them”, and creates the 
perception that legal status must be highly regulated and evaluated, or else the country 
will fail. Furthermore, by comparing the loss of a strong citizenry to a return to the 
colonial era, the DHA creates a sense of fear that blurring rights to citizenship in South 
Africa will revert the young democracy into a submissive and oppressed entity of foreign 
powers.  
 
Criminality and Fraud 
 
Throughout the policy papers, the DHA’s xenophobia is further demonstrated as it 
equates foreign nationals and migrants to criminal activity and fraud. While it cannot be 
denied that some foreign nationals engage in criminal and fraudulent behavior (in both 
the immigration and asylum contexts), the DHA repeatedly conflates non-citizenship 
with criminal intent. In fact, the DHA explicitly situates foreign nationals within a 
context of crime and burden on the economy. This is an important connection because it 
delegitimizes the individual’s purpose in South Africa, and creates a social and political 
enemy threatening South Africans. 
 First, the DHA adopts language in its policy papers that are politically charged 
and connote (if not explicitly accuses) criminal activity. In fact, the WPIM bluntly uses 
the definition: 
Irregular migrants (or undocumented/illegal migrants): these are 
people who enter a country, usually in search of income-generating 
activities, without the necessary documents and permits.188 
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Additionally, the WPIM states: 
 
South Africa has become an attractive destination for illegal immigrants 
(undocumented migrants, border jumper, over-stayers, smuggled and 
trafficked persons) who pose a security threat to the economic stability 
and sovereignty of the country.189  
 
The term “illegal” is strongly politicized and emphasizes criminality as well as a status of 
not belonging. Furthermore, the DHA explicitly identifies these populations as “threats” 
not just to the economy, but also to the very identity of South Africa. 
Second, the DHA associates international migration with criminals and undesired 
persons. The Repositioning Paper and WPIM reject isolationism, noting that 
globalization and international law have made it “neither desirable nor possible” to end 
international migration.190 However, the DHA does state that the fast movement of 
people and information caused by globalization can create “serious threats, such as 
terrorism and a high level of transnational crime.”191 The DHA further states that: 
South Africa has not been successful in attracting and retaining sought-
after international migrants, such as skilled and business persons. Instead, 
the majority of international migrants are either low-skilled, asylum 
seekers or those who are granted residence on the basis of relationships 
(relative’s visas).192 
 
By dividing migrants into desirable and undesirable categories (and placing asylum 
seekers in the latter), the DHA vilifies a portion of the population, and effectively says 
these individuals are unworthy of South African support.  
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 In the Repositioning Paper, the DHA not only highlights potential criminal 
threats, but also adverse economic impacts of foreign nationals manipulating South 
African services when migration is not properly managed: 
Levels of corruption and fraud are high and there is serious exposure to 
transnational crime. Just a few high-profile foreign criminals based in 
South Africa can result in costs to the state and society that are greater 
than the annual operating budget of immigration. The overall loss to the 
economy is much higher. Factors are inefficiencies impacting on trade, 
investment and gaps in critical skills; foreign migrants without legal 
documentation accessing services; and the high cost of social unrest. Gaps 
in policy relating to asylum seekers and irregular labour flows have been 
particularly costly.193 
 
Deputy Minister Fatima Chohan repeats the allegation that foreign nationals use and 
abuse social services in her article Refugee Rulings Undermine Policy, stating: 
 [I]rregular (or illegal) migration… is not benign to a mixed economy such 
as ours, and the strain on the Health Department’s resources is evident in 
Gauteng, where most undocumented migrants are concentrated… Our Bill 
of Rights reserves the right to enter and reside in the country only to 
citizens… If [non-citizens] enter illegally, [non-citizens] should surely not 
have an automatic right to remain in and have equal access to state 
resources.194 
 
Deputy Minister Chohan recognizes the importance of South Africa’s commitment to 
human rights and that this perspective “does not sit comfortably with the notion that poor 
people looking for a better life should be dealt with as criminals.”195 However, she notes, 
the DHA must still enforce South African laws and the Constitution. 
  Deputy Minister Chohan’s language is similar to that in the policy papers, with a 
strong basis in terms of threats and criminality, threats to the security and the safety of 
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South Africans, and threats to the economy. She lodges an accusation that migrants 
deplete social services such as health resources. Importantly though, her statement 
misleads readers to think that migrants receive free health care and are in effect stealing 
resources by failing to acknowledge payment policies that prevent foreign nationals from 
accessing free health care.196 Additionally, while the Deputy Minister is rightly 
concerned with upholding the Constitution, her interpretation of the Bill of Rights leads 
to the conclusion that foreign nationals should be barred from state services, despite the 
Constitution stating “everyone has the right to have access to health care services.”197  
Another important detail missing is that asylum seekers do not always have 
proper travel documents as a consequence of their flight from persecution. Asylum 
seekers therefore cannot always enter a country regularly. Additionally, many asylum 
seekers pay into social services, such as the Unemployment Insurance Fund. Despite 
these critical details, the DHA uses these accusations to justify the abandonment of a 
rights-based approach to migration. 
Third, the Repositioning Paper announces the department will begin to use a risk-
based approach to better address alleged criminal activity by foreign nationals generally 
and in the asylum system specifically. The rights-based approach centered on the formal 
rights afforded to foreign nationals by international and domestic laws.198 This approach 
meant that immigrants (and more relevantly asylum seekers) were afforded rights as a 
matter of course regardless of individual immigration status. However, the DHA 
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determined that the “biased” approach was “limited to compliance” with legislation and 
international treaties, and thus failed to protect South Africa from corruption, terrorism, 
drug smuggling, and labor practices harmful to the economy.199 These risks, the WPIM 
warns, result in increased social xenophobia and instability.200 
 Instead, risk assessment is the sole and proper method to secure immigration 
management.201 Neither paper defines risk, or clarifies how risk will be assessed. 
However, in a presentation before the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home 
Affairs regarding progress on the WPIM in October 2017, Acting Director General Jackie 
McKay202 distinguished high risk migrants from low risk migrants as those likely to 
engage in criminal activity and/or serve time in prison.203 McKay reasoned that the DHA 
had limited resources for deportations, and consequently the DHA must decide which 
foreign nationals would require the most expenditure.204 
McKay’s definition of high versus low risk migrants operates on the assumption 
that the DHA will have to deport every foreign national. This assumption that every 
foreign national will commit a crime or fraud in South Africa not only conflates foreign 
nationals with criminal activity, but it also creates and reinforces the belief that foreign 
nationals cannot be trusted and will eventually betray South Africa.  
  
 
New Policy Regarding Asylum System 
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The DHA identifies the asylum system as a casualty of abuse and fraud by foreign 
nationals. This abuse is in part because of gaps in policy, but partly because of the liberal 
nature of the Refugees Act. In the WPIM, the DHA discusses the need for changes in the 
asylum system and proposes new policies (which influenced the new amendment). 
However, the identified causes for abuse rely on unsupported assumptions of fraud and 
therefore the proposed changes to the system create unfair burdens on asylum seekers. 
At the Regional Conference of the International Association of Refugee Law 
Judges in October 2016, Minister Gigaba explained the necessary balance between 
immigration and asylum policies: 
[I]f States determine that generosity in refugee policy is used to subvert its 
sovereignty, they may feel compelled to withdraw refugee protection 
politically, legally, and in practice. So it is important that we recognize 
this conceptual relationship between immigration management and 
protection of asylum seekers and refugees. Arguably, when South Africa 
adopted new policy and legislation on refugees in the late 1990s, we did so 
with insufficient consideration for its relationship with immigration policy 
more broadly… By failing to anticipate, manage and accommodate the 
large number of migrants from our neighbouring countries, who could not 
get mainstream immigration visas to work and reside in South Africa, our 
immigration policy undermined our refugee policy.205 
 
Minister Gigaba continued on to declare that South Africa’s immigration system, which 
does not include a low-skill work visa, failed to manage economic migrants from 
southern Africa and thus undermined the refugee policy.206  
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The DHA claims that the liberal asylum system invites abuse by economic 
migrants and asylum seekers alike. According to the DHA, 90 percent of asylum seekers 
in South Africa are really economic migrants207 fraudulently applying for asylum to take 
advantage of South Africa’s relatively strong economy, lax application of rules, and 
access to services and work permits.208 As South Africa has the strongest economy in 
southern Africa, the DHA claims the asylum system affords a “de facto long-term work-
visa” to economic migrants who cannot enter South Africa through the restrictive 
immigration system.209  
The “principle of inclusion” allows a person to apply for asylum at any time. 
When an asylum seeker first arrives in South Africa, he or she has the responsibility to 
report to a Refugee Reception Office (RRO), and to present his or her claim for refugee 
status. Legally, according to the Refugees Act of 1998, he or she is supposed to do this 
within fourteen days of arriving, but this is not enforced. The DHA argues this practice 
results in applications for asylum in most cases where an individual has overstayed his or 
her visa in order to “legitimise” his or her stay in South Africa.210 The DHA goes on to 
cite: 
For instance, in 2011 while more than 12,3 million movements were 
captured in the enhanced Movement Control System (eMCS) in respect of 
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foreign arrivals; only 10,8 million departure movements were captured in 
respect to foreigners (sic).211 
 
However, the DHA does not provide any proof to support these claims. The DHA does 
not even provide data or explanation to ensure the 1.5 million difference in “movements” 
excludes longer term visas or visits extending into the next calendar year. Moreover, the 
DHA fails to support its claims that the 1.5 million foreign nationals applied for asylum.  
 The proposed policy changes to the asylum system begin with the admission 
policy. While the DHA argues that the previously discussed “principle of inclusion” 
should continue, the department notes that the principle should be limited to ensure 
national security and rights of citizens. Therefore, the department intends to establish 
Asylum Seeker Processing Centres at ports of entries “to profile and accommodate 
asylum seekers during their status determination process.”212 Minister Gigaba identified 
the three goals the DHA must accomplish while an asylum seeker is detained at a 
Processing Centre: 
 Firstly, we must definitively establish their identity, as often they may not 
have identity documents. Secondly, we must determine whether they 
should be recognized as refugees, within a prescribed period of weeks or 
months. Finally, we must ensure they are provided with food, shelter, and 
any required health care or social services.213 
 
Asylum seekers will be detained with possible restrictions on their movement depending 
on a determination of low or high risk. While detained, the DHA, other government 
departments (such as Social Development, Health, and Energy), and the UNHCR will 
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provide asylum seekers with services. In addition to the creation of the Processing 
Centres, the DHA announced the elimination of the automatic right to work and study. 
The DHA reasons that because asylum seekers’ basic needs will be provided for in the 
Processing Centres, asylum seekers will not have the automatic opportunity to work or 
study. 
The risk-based approach will not mitigate xenophobia as the department suggests 
in the WPIM, but rather increase social xenophobia.214 The DHA’s solution to high-risk 
asylum seekers is to detain them in the Processing Centres. While the DHA argues that 
this does not violate its non-encampment stance,215 the DHA’s encampment policy only 
specifically refers to refugees. The fact that the DHA will detain asylum seekers for 
months at a time is synonymous with camps. Furthermore, as detainees, asylum seekers 
must be provided with food and other basic necessities by the government and 
organizations.  
 
Refugees Act Amendment 2017 
 
In addition to the policy papers, the DHA pushed an amendment to the Refugees 
Act through parliament. The Refugees Amendment Act 11 of 2017 (the Amendment) was 
passed by Parliament and signed into law by former President Jacob Zuma in late 2017. 
The Amendment includes several new regulations for that negatively affect asylum 
seekers. These new provisions, founded in the new policies from the Repositioning Paper 
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and WPIM, create restrictions for applying for an asylum and the rights associated with 
an Asylum Seeker Permit. 
Minister Gigaba addressed the need for a balance between moral concerns for 
human rights with political concerns for citizens. He outlined the balance as: 
Morally we are obliged to consider whether we, as the African and world 
community, are responding sufficiently to the human crisis of the millions 
of Africans fleeing conflict and deprivation as refugees and economic 
migrants… Politically, a country’s ability to determine who may enter and 
exit its territory, and on what terms, is a core aspect of national 
sovereignty which all of the 200 or so countries in the international state 
system retain.216 
 
In doing so, the Amendment shortens the mandated time period open to an asylum seeker 
to report to an RRO to apply for asylum, and creates a new prohibition on applications 
after that time period lapses. Section 4, entitled “Exclusion from refugee status” includes 
a new subsection that states: 
4. (1) An asylum seeker does not qualify for refugee status for the 
purposes of this Act if a Refugee Status Determination Officer has 
reason to believe that he or she –  
 
… 
 
(i) has failed to report to the Refugee Reception Office within 
five days of entry into the Republic as contemplated in 
section 21, in the absence of compelling reasons, which 
may include hospitalisation, institutionalisation or any 
other compelling reason: Provided that this provision shall 
not apply to a person who, while being in the Republic on a 
valid visa, other than a visa issued in terms of section 23 of 
the Immigration Act, applies for asylum.217 
 
During parliamentary deliberations, Deputy Minister Fatima Chohan explained 
that the reporting does not necessarily mean lodging an application. Officials at an RRO 
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may turn away an asylum seeker wishing to apply for asylum if it is not the correct day 
for asylum seekers with that nationality to apply.218 There was no discussion on whether 
the appointment slip would be well documented,219 nor was a further detailed definition 
of “compelling reasons” offered.  
This new provision also fails to take into account an asylum seeker’s limited 
understanding of asylum and immigration laws. Often, asylum seekers come to South 
Africa to join family, friends, or a community network from their country of origin. This 
means that they are entering the country with a specific destination in mind, to rejoin 
these groups. Therefore, they are not stopping at the border and immediately reporting 
their asylum claim and getting documented, they are going to join these networks. Once 
they reach their destination, their community network advises them on the process they 
must follow to receive documentation.  
Legally, the new limitation on asylum seekers to report to an RRO within five 
days of arriving in South Africa also creates a very serious potential risk for violating the 
principle of non-refoulement, which South Africa is compelled to uphold under the UN 
and OAU conventions. The resulting exclusion from applying for asylum once the five 
days has lapsed assumes that newcomers are aware and understand the asylum process 
and domestic law. The new restriction also sets a very high burden for the newcomer to 
lodge a complaint after the five days considering he or she must satisfy the "compelling 
reasons" standard, which is at once vague and demanding. Additionally, there is a high 
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risk that many newcomers who do not reach the RRO in time will be returned to their 
country of origin and persecution they were fleeing.  
Additionally, the new amendment also states that an individual on an immigration 
visa, governed by the Immigration Act, may apply for asylum and forfeit his or her 
immigration visa.220 However, the amendment does not provide a time period in which 
the sur-place refugee221 must report to an RRO once events creating the sur-place 
refugee transpire. This omission leaves a potential sur-place refugee vulnerable to 
conflicting application of the amendment and prohibition from applying for asylum. 
The Amendment also restricts how an asylum seeker may lodge his or her claim.  
Subsection 21(1B) states: 
An applicant who may not be in possession of an asylum transit visa as 
contemplated in section 23 of the Immigration Act, must be interviewed 
by an immigration officer to ascertain whether valid reasons exist as to 
why the applicant is not in possession of such visa.222  
 
Furthermore, Section 21(6) provides: 
An application for asylum, which is found to contain false, dishonest or 
misleading information, whether by a Refugee Status Determination 
Officer, when considering the application, the Standing Committee, when 
reviewing, monitoring or supervising a decision or the Refugee Appeals 
Authority, when adjudicating an appeal, must be rejected.223  
 
Subsection 21(1B) does not take into account that many asylum seekers running from 
persecution do not have a passport or fear to travel on documents provided by a 
persecuting government. Furthermore, the section does not include guidelines as to what 
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an appropriate response would be, and no clarification as to what would or would not 
qualify as a valid reason. Moreover, the stipulation in subsection 21(6) that an 
immigration officer will conduct the interview, as opposed to an official specifically 
trained on refugee law, poses a risk of improper application of refugee law. 
The Amendment also restricts the Asylum Seeker Permit in terms of rights 
(specifically the rights to work and study) and its administration. Section 22 of the new 
amendment, entitled “Asylum seeker visa,” provides rights and restrictions prescribed to 
asylum seekers holding the proper visa. Specifically, subsections (6)-(14) provide the 
relevant requirements pertaining to work and study rights: 
(6)  An asylum seeker may be assessed to determine his or her ability 
to sustain himself or herself, and his or her dependents, either with 
or without the assistance of family or friends, for a period of at 
least four months. 
(7)  If, after assessment, it is found that an asylum seeker is unable to 
sustain himself or herself and his or her dependants, as 
contemplated in subsection (6), that asylum seeker may be offered 
shelter and basic necessities provided by the UNHCR or any other 
charitable organisaton or person.224 
 
These two subsections formally enact the WPIM’s intention to remove the 
automatic right to work and study. The DHA places a large administrative burden on 
itself to conduct assessments on every asylum seeker and conscripts charitable 
organizations to support asylum seekers. The UNHCR objected to the DHA explicitly 
naming the organization in the new amendment as a possible source of funding and 
assistance to asylum seekers who are not able to provide for themselves. The UNHCR’s 
objection to its inclusion in the amendment stems from the UNHCR’s stance that “the 
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right to work is a fundamental human right, integral to human dignity and self-respect, 
and that reliance on assistance is not conducive to self-sufficiency.”225 
Subsections (8)-(10) provide the administrative details for endorsing the right to 
work and study: 
(8)  The right to work in the Republic may not be endorsed on the 
asylum seeker visa of any applicant who –  
(a) is unable to sustain himself or herself and his or her 
dependants, as contemplated in subsection (6); 
(b) is offered shelter and basic necessities by the UNHCR or 
any other charitable organisation or person, as 
contemplated in subsection (7); or 
(c) seeks to extend the right to work, after having failed to 
produce a letter of employment as contemplated in 
subsection (9): Provided that such extension may be 
granted if a letter of employment is subsequently produced 
while the application in terms of section 21 is still pending. 
(9)  In the event that the right to work or study is endorsed on the 
asylum seeker visa, the relevant employer, in the case of a right to 
work, and the relevant educational institution, in the case of a right 
to study, must furnish the Department with a letter of employment 
or of enrolment at the educational institution, as the case may be, 
in the prescribed form within a period of 14 days from the date of 
the asylum seeker taking up employment or being enrolled, as the 
case may be. 
(10) An employer or educational institution contemplated in subsection 
(9) who or which fails to comply with the duty imposed in that 
subsection, or fraudulently issues the letter contemplated in that 
subsection, is guilty of an offence and liable upon conviction to a 
fine not exceeding R20 000.226 
 
The fine is a huge deterrent to employ and educate asylum seekers, which 
compounds the existing hesitancy to employ asylum seekers due to their seemingly 
temporary status.227 Asylum permits, typically granted for one to six months at a time, 
give the impression that the asylum seeker will only have temporary legal status in the 
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country, and many employers unfamiliar with the prolonged nature of the asylum process 
avoid hiring asylum seekers on the misconception that asylum seekers will not be able to 
work on a permanent basis. 
Subsection (11) allows for the right to work or study to be revoked: 
 (11) The Director-General must revoke any right to work as endorsed 
on the asylum seeker visa if the holder thereof is unable to prove 
that he or she is employed after a period of six months from the 
date on which such right was endorsed.228 
 
The requirement that the asylum seeker must prove employment within six months places 
a high burden on the asylum seeker. The unemployment rate in South Africa is 26.7 
percent, the likelihood that an asylum seeker, especially one new to South Africa, will not 
secure work within six months is high.229 The Amendment also fails to provide what will 
happen to an asylum seeker who loses the right to work and does not have friends, 
family, or an organization to assist him or her. 
Subsections (12)-(14) provide regulations for expired asylum permits: 
(12) The application for asylum of any person who has been issued with 
a visa contemplated in subsection (1) must be considered to be 
abandoned and must be endorsed to this effect by the Standing 
Committee on the basis of the documentation at its disposal if such 
asylum seeker fails to present himself or herself for renewal of the 
visa after a period of one month from the date of expiry of the visa, 
unless the asylum seeker provides, to the satisfaction of the 
Standing Committee, reasons that he or she was unable to present 
himself or herself, as required, due to hospitalisation or any other 
form of institutionalisation or any other compelling reason. 
 (13)  An asylum seeker whose application is considered to be abandoned 
in accordance with subsection (12) may not re-apply for asylum 
and must be dealt with as an illegal foreigner in terms of section 32 
of the Immigration Act. 
 (14)  Any person who fails to return a visa in accordance with 
subsection (2), or fails to comply with any condition set out in a 
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visa issued in terms of this section, or is in possession of an 
expired visa, is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a 
fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or to 
both a fine and such imprisonment.230 
 
As previously mentioned, hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers currently do not have 
valid permits.231 Due to insufficient funds from a lack of right to work, it will only be 
harder for asylum seekers to travel. The prohibition on reapplications for lapsed or 
"abandoned" claims poses an immense risk of violating non-refoulement. The provision 
allowing for imprisonment therefore allows for an asylum seeker who lost the right to 
work due to his or her inability to secure employment within six months and yet does not 
have assistance from a charitable organization, could be imprisoned for holding an 
expired visa if he or she does not have the required funds to travel across the country 
within a month and a day of his or her visa expiring. 
 
Cape Town Refugee Reception Office Closure 
 
Administrative decisions taken by the DHA demonstrate its lack of concern for 
asylum seekers while it limits their rights and access to services. One such decision was 
Director General (DG) Mkuseli Apleni’s decision to close the Cape Town RRO in 2012 
and again in 2014.   
RROs are the nexus of the asylum process’s administration. Asylum seekers lodge 
asylum claims, attend interviews with RSDO and RAB officials, and receive (and renew) 
asylum permits as well as other documents. Asylum seeker permits do not have legislated 
time periods for validity, but most are issued for three to six months. However, when 
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officials expect a decision to be issued soon, permits may only be valid for one month at 
a time. The number and nature of RRO services and the frequency of permit renewals 
means asylum seekers frequently attend an RRO. Considering that an asylum claim can 
take over a decade to process and that RROs also manage refugees, RRO accessibility is 
crucial for asylum seekers. 
South Africa only had at most six RROs, with varying levels of functionality. 
Currently, the Port Elizabeth and Cape Town RROs are closed to newcomers and only 
serve existing file holders. Pretoria, Musina, and Durban RROs are fully operational and 
serve existing and new asylum seekers. The number, location, and varying functionality 
of the RROs requires many asylum seekers to travel great distances, costing money and 
time (a particular concern for employed asylum seekers). Additionally, fines to renew 
expired permits, bribes, and service delivery barriers at the RROs themselves (such as 
frequent computer system crashes and long queues) increase the difficulty of maintaining 
valid documents. Thus, the DG’s decision to close the Cape Town RRO carried strong 
impacts. 
Between May 2011 and June 2012, three of the six RROs in South Africa were 
closed.232 The DG first decided in May 2012 to close the Cape Town Refugee Reception 
Office (CTRRO) to new applications, effective June 30, 2012.233 Following years of 
logistical challenges resulting from zoning and capacity issues, the DG announced in 
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early June 2012 that the CTRRO would permanently close at the end of the month, and 
only offer continuing services234 to asylum seekers and refugees whose physical files 
were housed in the RRO.235 Members of civil society brought the closure before the 
Western Cape High Court seeking the reopening of the RRO because the DHA did not 
follow proper procedure when it failed to consult with SCRA, civil society, and other 
interested parties as mandated under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 
of 2000 (PAJA).236 The matter was eventually heard before the Supreme Court of 
Appeals, which ordered the DG to make a new decision by November 2013.237 The new 
decision and reasons provided, discussed below, were also litigated before the Supreme 
Court in 2017. 
In December 2013, the DHA hosted a single meeting in Johannesburg238 for 
stakeholders to submit comments.239 The UNHCR, Legal Resources Centre, Lawyers for 
Human Rights, UCT Refugees Rights Unit, and others submitted comments.240 None of 
the stakeholders supported the CTRRO’s closure.241 Despite these comments, the DG 
announced in January 2014 the CTRRO would remain closed permanently and a Cape 
Town Temporary Refugee Facility would remain open until all asylum files in Cape 
Town were finalized.242 This barred asylum seekers from lodging new applications in 
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Cape Town and existing asylum seekers and refugees who did not have their physical file 
housed in Cape Town from accessing services at the CTRRO. Asylum seekers and 
refugees in the latter category would now have to travel to the RRO where they first 
applied for asylum, unless he or she could prove “exceptional” circumstances.243 The 
RROs in Musina, Pretoria, and Durban would be expected to serve all asylum seekers and 
refugees whose physical files are housed in the office and all future applicants. 
In February 2014, the DG published his reasons for deciding to keep the CTRRO 
closed. The DG cited three main possible solutions stakeholders had proposed to continue 
the CTRRO’s operations: using the current location of the CTRRF as a fully functional 
RRO, establishing satellite offices, and establishing an RRO outside Cape Town’s city 
limits. The DG ultimately decided that the solutions were not viable. The DG’s 
procedural and substantive actions illustrate the DHA’s implementation its xenophobic 
framing.  
Procedurally, the DHA’s refusal to receive input from stakeholders and civil 
society members who provide advice and support to asylum seekers highlights the 
DHA’s bad faith in managing the asylum system. Furthermore, at the stakeholder 
meeting, the DHA denied any intention to close the Cape Town RRO.244 The 
misrepresentation of the meeting’s purpose shows the DHA’s unwillingness to properly 
provide a system of protection to asylum seekers. 
Substantively, the DG gave two main reasons why the first proposed solution, 
running the CTTRF as an RRO, was impractical. The DG stated that the current location 
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(known as Customs House) is not suitable for a full RRO because the DHA had already 
been threatened with legal action for nuisance complaints and the premises are too small 
to “accommodate large numbers of people” or persons with disabilities.245 However, by 
this logic, the DHA expects a significant number of asylum seekers and refugees to 
attend the RRO for services. The DHA cannot deny a need for a fully functional RRO in 
Cape Town, and thus it is inappropriate that the DG and the DHA expect the RROs in 
Musina, Pretoria, and Durban to not only adequately serve the nation’s asylum seekers 
and refugees, but all future applicants as well. 
The second proposed solution, the satellite offices, was rejected for three reasons. 
First, the DG misinterpreted a Court decision to read that satellite offices were prohibited 
by law.246 Second, the DG claims satellite offices would be pose “logistical difficulties” 
in that the file transfers between the satellite offices would “complicate any fast-tracking 
of status determination.”247 Third, the DG states that conducting surveys to identify 
possible locations would be “time-consuming.”248  
The reasons provided by the DG fall short of persuasive. The fact that it would 
take time and resources to find a suitable location is not a legitimate reason to sever 
services to a vulnerable population such as asylum seekers. The 2017 Court determined 
that the DG’s reasons did not meet the rational standard to allow for the limitation of 
                                                 
245 Apleni, “Re: Reasons for the decision of the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs made 
on January 2014 in respect of the future of the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office,” 4. 
246 In fact, the Court stated the opposite, allowing for satellite offices to fulfill the duties of a single RRO. 
See Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (1107/2016) 
2017 (4) SA 686 (SCA) at ¶ 59. 
247 Apleni, “Re: Reasons for the decision of the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs made 
on January 2014 in respect of the future of the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office,” 6. 
248 Ibid. 
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rights.249 Additionally, the Court noted in the 2017 matter, the DG offered conflicting 
testimony regarding the timeline for surveys.250  
Regarding the third proposed solution, a fully functioning RRO outside Cape 
Town’s boundaries, the DG stated that the many applications for asylum in Cape Town 
have led to “logistical difficulties” and that: 
Re-opening/maintaining a fully functional RRO in Cape Town would 
require the Department to deploy substantial additional resources to ensure 
that the RRO is free from the nuisance and disturbance concerns that have 
previously arisen.251 
 
The search for suitable premises must be conducted in conjuncture with the Department 
of Public Works (DPW) in a “complex and time-consuming” process.252 The DHA and 
DPW had already searched for suitable premises yet were unsuccessful. The DG 
estimates that a successful search could take up to two years to complete.253 
Again, the high number of asylum applications is indicative of a strong need for a 
fully operational RRO in Cape Town. While the DHA must consider budgetary and 
resource constraints, the fact that the search for new premises would take time and 
resources does not outweigh the limitation of constitutional rights. The DG’s extreme 
imbalance of concerns for resources compared to the severe limitations of constitutional 
rights is irrational, unlawful, and demonstrates the DHA’s xenophobic attitude.254 The 
acute bias was perpetuated before the Supreme Court. In oral arguments, the Court 
                                                 
249 Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (1107/2016) 2017 (4) 
SA 686 (SCA). 
250 Ibid at ¶ 56. 
251 Apleni, “Re: Reasons for the decision of the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs made 
on January 2014 in respect of the future of the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office,” 8. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid. 
254 The SCA found that the DG’s decision was irrational and unlawful. The Court ordered the CTRRO to be 
reopened and for the DHA to provide a report detailing the center’s reopening. The DHA has failed to do 
so at the time of publication. 
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questioned the DG’s high regard for the DHA’s resources relative to the rights of asylum 
seekers. The DHA’s advocates argued that the long commute for the DHA officials 
staffing the RRO outside of Cape Town would be an unfair burden on the employees. It 
is important to note that the closest RRO to Cape Town is 1,500 kilometers away. Placing 
such a high value on the personal effects this proposed solution would have on 
compensated employees rather than providing services to a vulnerable population that is 
not South African exemplifies the DHA’s xenophobia. 
The DG goes on to state he also considered other factors when deciding whether 
to re-open the RRO, including that: 
The majority of asylum seekers who previously applied at the CTRRO 
were not genuine asylum seekers, but economic migrants who came to 
Cape Town in search of work. This is borne out by a comprehensive audit 
of files at the CTRRO prior to my decision of 30 May 2012. This audit 
revealed that approximately 77% of the applications adjudicated from 
2008 to the date of the audit were rejected.255 
 
The DG’s statistics not specify if the decisions were made by RSDOs, however it 
is important to note that the RSDOs are poorly trained and often do not make 
accurate status determinations. A study of RSDO decisions found that RSDOs 
often err in their application of refugee law and fail to consider details of claims, 
resulting in “a bureaucracy that mass produces rejection letters.”256 Regardless of 
the accuracy of the decisions, the statistics still demonstrate that almost 25 percent 
of applications are genuine, and therefore by law are entitled to services. 
                                                 
255 Apleni, “Re: Reasons for the decision of the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs made 
on January 2014 in respect of the future of the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office,” 9. 
256 Amit, All Roads Lead to Rejections, 16; See also Akanakimana v Chairperson of the Standing committee 
for refugee Affairs and Others, No. 10970/13, 2015 ZAWCHC (Saflii).  
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 The DG cites the government’s entitlement to “control the asylum 
application process” and even “restrict access to RROs in urban areas where 
access to RROs has historically been abused by economic migrants.”257 While the 
DG concedes that this policy may place a burden on genuine asylum seekers, “this 
hardship must be considered in light of Government’s legitimate need to regulate 
the asylum application process and access to RROs.”258 Again, the DHA 
determines the asylum seeker population as an acceptable casualty when 
considering government resources.  
Geographically, the DG reasons that because the majority of asylum seekers using 
the CTRRO did not enter South Africa through a Cape Town point of entry, an RRO is 
not needed in the city. The DHA’s records show that from 2008 to 2012, fewer than ten 
asylum seekers entered through Cape Town each month.259 His logic demands the 
conclusion then that asylum seekers should only access RROs where they enter the 
border, not where they are able to live and work. This clearly suggests the DHA is of the 
opinion that asylum seekers should stay on the periphery of South Africa, near the 
borders, and not enter into the rest of the country.  
It is important to note that the DG’s reasons for not re-opening the RRO were 
published in early 2014, a few years before the policy papers. At the time, there were 
rumors that the DHA was going to adopt a policy of relocating RROS to the northern 
borders and de facto remove asylum seekers from urban centers. However, no formal 
                                                 
257 Apleni, “Re: Reasons for the decision of the Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs made 
on January 2014 in respect of the future of the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office,” 10 
258 Ibid. 
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policy existed to support the DG’s reasoning that RROs should only exist where asylum 
seekers enter South Africa. 
Finally, the DG argues that the remaining three RROs “are sufficient to serve the 
needs of asylum seekers and refugees” in the country.260 Furthermore, he gives 
assurances that he has: 
[C]onsidered the view of the stakeholders that there are backlogs at the 
above RROs and that these backlogs will increase with the closure of the 
CTRRO. To the extent necessary, additional resources and measures will 
be deployed in order to meet any increased flow of asylum seekers at these 
RROs… While I take cognisance of stakeholders’ views that RROs should 
be maintained and opened in urban or metropolitan areas where there are 
more job opportunities, I do not regard this as a sufficiently compelling 
basis for re-opening/maintaining a fully functional CTRRO…261 
 
The DG acknowledges that there will be a higher burden placed on the other RROs 
following the closure of the CTRRO, and has planned the reallocation of resources 
accordingly. This contradicts the DG’s argument that the DHA lacks resources to 
maintain the CTRRO. The DG does not cite progressive realization as an impediment to 
re-opening the CTRRO, and so it is unclear why these resources could not be used in 
Cape Town. The only logical conclusion one may draw is that this is an attempt to 
remove asylum seekers from urban areas and place them into a more manageable 
location.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past created a noteworthy dynamic within 
South African identity. Racial divisions, shared experiences, and nation-building interact 
to form a new South African identity dependent on excluding foreign nationals. The 
government plays a critical role influencing identity through the nation-building process, 
particularly in post-colonial African states. In South Africa, the DHA’s mandate to 
protect national sovereignty and manage the immigration and asylum systems situates the 
department on the front lines of nation-building and conceptualizing identity. The DHA 
crafted asylum policies with the knowledge and intent that the policies will dictate the 
future of South African identity. The DHA’s emphasis on the importance of citizenship in 
maintaining sovereignty means that the division between citizens and non-citizens is 
crucial for South Africa’s very existence.  
 The DHA’s approach to the asylum system is successful in addressing some 
human rights concerns, especially its activities associated with human trafficking, as well 
as fulfilling its mandate to serve South African citizens. Furthermore, the DHA is 
appropriately concerned with the safety and security of South African citizens and with 
managing the agency’s assets effectively, especially given the realistic limitations on the 
country’s resources. 
 However, the DHA’s approach to the asylum system engages in xenophobic 
language, conflating foreign nationals with criminality. It marginalizes asylum seekers 
within society by severely limiting their access to rights and opportunities. It also violates 
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international law in number of ways. The actions of the department demonstrate its de 
facto retraction of South Africa’s self-determined commitments to human rights. 
The language of criminality and fraud creates a fear and mistrust of the accused 
asylum seeker population. Restrictive legislation that physically removes asylum seekers 
from economic and social centers prevents integration and reinforces fears of the 
unknown. Administrative decisions that severely limit rights and place clear priority on 
non-asylum seekers further burdens an already vulnerable population and is a clear 
indication to all that asylum seekers are a low priority in the expenditure of resources. 
These policies and actions demonstrate the department’s xenophobia, which unfairly 
harms asylum seekers to a point which potentially violates international law. 
 Government messages that equate foreign nationals with criminals reinforces and 
normalizes xenophobic attitudes within society and subverts the human rights and 
inclusive spirit of the Constitution. Keeping asylum seekers separate from the general 
population will preclude any understanding of the complicated reasons for asylum, thus 
dispelling the threat of the unknown. Politically, subverting the Constitution weakens the 
rule of law specifically regarding human rights in South Africa. 
 The Processing Centres both hurt asylum seekers’ ability to integrate into society 
and will stir South African resentment towards asylum seekers. While the DHA is 
technically continuing its policy of non-encampment for refugees, detaining asylum 
seekers will overburden a department already struggling with service delivery and asylum 
backlog challenges. Therefore, it is likely that status determination will become a 
protracted process during which asylum seekers must live physically and psychologically 
separate from the rest of South Africa along the northern borders. While this does not 
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strictly violate the DHA’s non-encampment principle or rights to freedom of movement, 
it does subvert the spirit of these principles. Moreover, the policy to detain requires the 
government or the UNHCR to provide free basic services. This will only exasperate 
existing perceptions that asylum seekers receive special treatment from the government 
while citizens suffer in poverty. 
The DG’s decision to close the CTRRO exhibits the DHA’s indifference to 
increasing burdens on asylum seekers while restricting rights. While the DG should 
consider available resources when making administrative actions, this irrational decision 
did not appropriately weigh the limitations of rights on asylum seekers. Furthermore, the 
CTRRO’s closure penalizes asylum seekers for the DHA’s own maladministration of the 
asylum system. The DHA should manage RROs in a manner consistent with international 
law, the South African constitution, and human rights instead of creating unnecessary 
barrier for a vulnerable population. 
Several Amendment sections raise serious concerns regarding proper application 
of international refugee law. Subsection 21(1B) unfair penalizes asylum seekers without 
travel documents or passports. Without regular travel documents, asylum seekers may 
fear authorities at the border and bypass border crossings when entering South Africa. 
Asylum seekers should not be penalized or barred from lodging an asylum claim because 
their fear of persecution forced them to flee without a passport. This provision risks 
subjecting asylum seekers to unfair legal proceedings and potentially violate non-
refoulement. 
Additionally, the mandatory language requiring a rejection for false information is 
very concerning given some asylum seekers knowingly and/or unknowingly provide false 
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or incomplete information. Some reasons for this include language barriers, poor 
comprehension of the asylum process (and thus what is being asked),262 continuing 
concerns for his or her safety, or the inability to process and discuss trauma.263 The 
requirement that the application must be rejected without room for discretion is extremely 
prejudicial and also risks violating non-refoulement. 
While it is understandable that the DHA would want to manage the closure of 
expired permits, the quick finalization of permits expired for a month is an extreme 
provision that unnecessarily harms asylum seekers. Considering that half of the RROs are 
closed or only half-functioning, it is understandable that many asylum seekers have 
invalid documents. 
As the DHA stated in the policy papers, South Africa is entitled to legislate the 
asylum process to guard national security. Some of the provisions in the new Amendment 
will achieve this goal. However, the severe limitations and restrictions that the new 
provisions in the Amendment create breach the balance between rational legislation and 
harmful practices. Closing the Cape Town RRO creates undue burdens for asylum 
seekers based in Cape Town as they follow through every stage of the asylum process but 
must travel long distances to do so. The DHA should be mindful in its efforts to securely 
manage the asylum system. It undermines the DHA’s effectiveness when it legislates 
policies that prevent asylum seekers from integrating into South Africa and places them 
in a highly precarious financial and legal situation. The DHA is also on the precipice of 
crossing the line of violating international law. 
 
                                                 
262 68 percent of asylum applicants do not receive an explanation of the asylum process by RSDOs; See 
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